Centre Write

JOHN HAYES MP
on security and the EU

PHILIPPE LEGRAIN
and ED WEST
debate immigration

The great migration

THE RT HON CHRIS GRAYLING MP | PROFESSOR NICK PEARCE | MADELEINE SUMPTION | JONATHAN PORTES
Education and social policy
Bright Blue is generating fresh thinking about the purpose, design and financing of the UK’s education and welfare systems to boost life chances and national prosperity. To compete in the global race, Britain needs to significantly improve the skills of its workforce and broaden access to high quality academic and vocational education. As the economy becomes more globalised, competitive and automated, Britain’s social security system also needs revamping to improve its effectiveness and popularity.

Energy and environment
Bright Blue is a leading centre-right voice devising and promoting policies that can cost-effectively safeguard the environment at the same time as strengthening the economy. We produce rigorous analysis and fresh policy ideas to help the UK solve the ‘energy trilemma’ of achieving decarbonisation, affordable energy and security of supply. In particular, our work focuses on key policy areas such as energy, the natural environment, and sustainability and international development.

Human rights
Human rights now have a bad reputation among the public, especially conservatives. But human rights are vital. They protect individual freedom, especially from an overarching state. Our work explores how human rights can be better understood and enhanced in the UK and abroad, with a particular focus on: the contents of the forthcoming British Bill of Rights; the role of human rights in British foreign policy; and how to tackle racial, gender, sexual, disability and religious discrimination.

Immigration and integration
Immigration, on the whole, has been good for Britain, especially our economy. But it brings pressures, especially to low-skilled workers and certain communities. Our work devises ideas to ensure that the benefits of immigration are maximised and the challenges minimised. One such challenge is the integration of people from different social and economic backgrounds, which yields significant private and public benefits. Reforming institutions to encourage greater social mixing is particularly important for building a more integrated Britain.
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**Bright Blue**

Bright Blue is an independent think tank and pressure group for liberal conservatism.

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In 2010, I published a paper on some of the more technical aspects of the Alternative Vote. Interesting as this statistical analysis was, perhaps of greater interest was just how successful the ‘No to AV’ campaign was. The campaign, run by Matt Elliott (now on the Vote Leave campaign), proposed that the risks and costs of changing our voting system would outweigh the benefits. They won a landslide victory.

A victory for the status quo in a referendum is not unusual. Principles of behavioural economics will tell you that people are disproportionately affected by risk, and so there is an inherent bias at play. And perhaps this was a driver behind the Government’s second referendum victory - the momentary defeat of Scottish independence. When it comes to referendums (yes, that is the plural), David Cameron is a master strategist.

This month’s referendum is the third time the Prime Minister has backed the status quo, and the economics of the debate (plus, perhaps, having the machinery of Government onside) tells us he will win. But there are forces at play that he cannot possibly have imagined when he announced the in/out referendum in the run up to the last election.

Europe is on the move. More than a million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe in 2015 and this rate has remained more or less constant in 2016. The majority coming from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, driven by civil war and the threat of so-called Islamic State. So desperate is their plight that they have risked their lives and the lives of their families to cross into the sanctuary of the European Union where the rule of law and human rights can afford them political asylum.

And this at a time where immigration has never been so firmly on the political agenda. Net migration to the UK in 2015 was 330,000. This figure was driven in part by the arrival of refugees (actually only 60 per 100,000 of the population, compared to 1,800 for Hungary) who came from outside of Europe, but the majority was attributable to arrivals of EU citizens. This is, of course, driven by one of the great pillars of the EU: freedom of movement.

Concerns around EU-based immigration come from various corners. “They are taking our jobs” comes one cry - especially by those already affected by increasing automation of labour - in spite of evidence that EU immigrants are net contributors to our economy. “The strain on our public services is too great to cope” comes another - although if true this is perhaps more to do with internal population growth and Government failures over many decades. “I’m British, not European” says Nigel Farage, with a guffaw of populist nationalism under the guise of sovereignty concerns.

In this edition of Centre Write, we look at immigration. In the context of Europe, yes, but we also ask the wider questions around national identity, human rights and progress that stem naturally from the new immigration narrative.

In the Centre Write letter exchange, Ed West and Philippe Legrain (p.11) debate the fundamental question in the debate: whether immigration is good for Britain.

On Europe and migration, Minister for Security John Hayes MP (p.7) tells us, with regard to migration, how being a member of the EU affects Britain’s security. Chris Grayling MP (p.10) makes the case for Brexit, while Stephen Booth (p.8) says that the referendum will not settle the matter of immigration either way.

On the impact of migration, Sam Bowman (p.17) predicts that as economic inequality between EU nations falls, it is actually non-EU immigration that will become the pressing point. On public services and migration, James Johnson (p.15) asks what immigration means for the education system. Ian Preston (p.14) reminds us of the economic benefits of immigration, while Jonathan Portes (p.9) tells us that the referendum offers an opportunity for a new migration settlement.

On refugees, we speak to Richard Harrington MP (p.22), the Minister with responsibility for Syrian refugees. Alex Teytelboym and Will Jones (p.24) propose a new approach to placing refugees. David Burrowes MP (p.26) sets out the compassionate conservative approach to the refugee crisis, while Tanya Steel (p.27) highlights the plight of refugee children and the unique challenges they face.

On integration, we hear from Stephen Hale (p.28) on how best to support the integration of refugees to the UK. Anthony Heath (p.29) compares integration in Britain with that of other nations. Helen Carr (p.30) walks us through a history of Muslim integration in the UK and Thom Brooks (p.32) tells us that the UK citizenship test is not fit for purpose.

Finally, we look to the future and a better system for integration. Nick Hillman (p.34) details a plan for international students and Madeleine Sumption (p.35) demonstrates the difficulties of caps and targets. Paul Blomfield MP (p.36) sets out a proposal for reforming the detention of immigrants, and Don Flynn (p.37) shows how our immigration system can better serve families.

We have all of the usual books and arts reviews, and updates from the Bright Blue team, plus Robin Walker MP (p.18) tells us why he is a Bright Blue MP.

We hope that this edition of Centre Write provides some clarity around immigration and debunks some of the myths being peddled in the referendum campaign. And perhaps it will also provide food for thought in the wider debate on immigration that should follow, whatever the result on 23rd June.
Director’s note
Ryan Shorthouse

One week more. Then we will know Britain’s destiny: remaining in or leaving the European Union.

It was right for the Prime Minister to give the public a referendum, the third of his premiership. There have only been four referendums in UK history. David Cameron should be praised for doing direct democracy more than any of his predecessors.

But, admittedly, these past few months have been uncomfortable for the Tory Party. The EU has always provoked strong reactions from Conservatives, ever since the fractious period in the Major years over the Maastricht Treaty. But, during this referendum campaign, there has been an unjustified escalation in hyperbolic arguments and personal attacks – from both sides.

This behaviour will, sadly, only contribute to the ongoing erosion of trust in politicians, a worrying and damaging trend. For politics is a noble profession – crucial for the representation and resolution of different views in a democratic and civilised manner – which needs to attract both talent and respect to sustain the democratic tradition.

Bright Blue decided to take a step back from the EU referendum debate. Our staff, parliamentary supporters and members take different points of view. And the modernisers mantra, for a long time, has been to stop “banging on about Europe”.

However, this edition of the magazine does give space to those from either side of the EU campaign to outline their views, particularly in relation to immigration. After careful reading and deliberation, and an acknowledgement that there are good arguments on both sides of the campaign, my personal view is that Britain should remain in the EU. This is for two main reasons: our values and the evidence.

First, on values. Tory modernisation was an intellectual project that emerged in the 1990s to move the perception and focus of conservatism away from excessive individualism to communitarian values. My fear is that Brexit is driven by libertarian arguments masquerading as democratic ones: that ‘taking back control’ is in actual fact a desire for Britain to always get exactly what it wants, without compromising or sharing with others.

In our increasingly interconnected world, this is neither realistic nor desirable. The major problems we face – economic stagnation, environmental degradation and migration flows – are often caused by and usually resolved with others. Britain’s long-term interests are best served by leading and co-operating within international institutions such as the EU.

The EU really doesn’t seem to be as bad as what those campaigning for leave make out. All the policies that Conservatives often boast about – from deficit reduction to reforms to public services – wouldn’t have happened if the EU really was so omnipotent. Analysis by the London School of Economics shows that the UK has supported 87% of all EU votes. This is hardly a beastly institution enforcing rules and regulations on us that we do not want. We often call for and win key reforms: for instance, on introducing and extending the single market, or tougher environmental regulation.

Actually, the evidence shows that EU membership seems to have been rather helpful to Britain, particularly to our economy. Employment is now at a record high and our growth rate has been higher than other OECD countries for a whole, all while being a member of the EU. As the Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies wrote: “the best evidence is absolutely, unequivocally clear: we are much better off now than we would have been had we never joined the EU”.

If we remain in the EU, however, the UK must continue to push for substantial reform of the institution. A considerable proportion of the population will have voted to leave, largely because of the inability to control the number of people migrating to our country. The EU must face reality and learn the lessons of this flirtation with Brexit: the free movement of people is unsustainable in a growing bloc which contains countries with such diverse living standards. There needs to be a meaningful review and revision of this antiquated principle to lessen the huge flow of people across Europe, a phenomenon which is unfair to both richer and poorer member states. The stubborn attachment to it is undermining public support, and ultimately the survival of, the European Union. The British people, I suspect, will not be alone in Europe in calling for changes to freedom of movement in the years ahead.

Immigration has been broadly beneficial for the UK, especially to our economy. We should celebrate the fact that so many people want to come and live in the UK – it is proof of our success as a country. But it does bring challenges. In the short-term, it depresses the wages of those on the lowest incomes. It puts pressure on crucial services – housing, health and schools – in particular communities. These challenges need to be better addressed. Bright Blue has been calling for the government to automatically commit to higher levels of funding through the Controlling Immigration Fund – which gives extra resources to local areas experiencing high levels of migration – every time the net migration target is breached each year. Our research shows that the public want an immigration system, above all, where we can control who comes here, prioritising those who will contribute most; as long as we have EU freedom of movement, we cannot achieve this.

The migration we face in Britain is indeed great, with over 300,000 net new people a year now settling long-term in this country. On the whole, this has made Britain greater; but there are great challenges too that require better policy responses if we are to have an immigration system that is fair and popular.

Ryan Shorthouse
Director of Bright Blue
The politics of EU immigration

Deborah Mattinson and Ben Shimshon on the political salience of EU immigration and the impact of the upcoming referendum

Back in 2005, the phrase “Australian Style Points System,” was a nailed on winner in our regular swing voter focus groups for the Labour Party. The policy spoke to toughness, control and fairness. Just a couple of years later, however, something changed. The initial, warm response would be quickly challenged by someone who ‘knew the truth’. With a knowing look they would say “ah, yeah, but that’s only the non-EU immigrants isn’t it?”. Suddenly a ‘common sense’ policy collapsed into yet another instance of political sleight of hand. At best, the scramble to appear tough on non-EU immigration was revealed to be focused on the marginal ripples while ignoring the main ‘tidal wave’. At worst, the public were almost equally split on whether the Conservatives or Labour would be the more competent, and the view from the focus groups was that both were as bad as each other: ‘unable to do anything because of the EU’.

Identifying the importance of immigration is easy, but pinpointing its electoral salience is much harder. Last year, the public were almost equally split on whether the Conservatives or Labour would be the more competent, and the view from the focus groups was that both were as bad as each other: ‘unable to do anything because of the EU’.

The 2015 results suggest the issue did not drive electoral outcomes. In the absence of a differentiator between the major parties on their top issue, many voters were essentially presented with two choices: Either vote for a mainstream party based on other factors (leadership, economic competence), or declare ‘a plague on both your houses’ and vote for UKIP – the only party that was prepared to take the question of EU migration head on. Although UKIP’s share of vote grew, it seems that they presented too big a leap for many, and even in those seats where their share could have been pivotal in handing the seat to one or other mainstream party, the churn resulting from the collapse of the Lib Dems often clouds the issue.

Because the two main parties are ‘equally bad’ on EU immigration, the issue hasn’t yet attained the power as a driver of political and electoral outcomes that its status as a top concern might warrant. However, should the seal of consensus on EU migration be broken, it is poised to become the decisive issue for any future election: UKIP’s share of the vote is larger than the winner’s margin in 88 of the 100 most marginal seats in the UK. Should policy towards migrants from the EU suddenly become “in play” for mainstream parties, those voters will surely become a major electoral battleground.

Whether intending to vote ‘remain’ or ‘leave’, most voters conclude that the EU has a negative impact on immigration. Immigration is the most important issue for those who are determined to vote to leave.

However, we vote in the referendum, immigration will continue to be centre stage

For 13 years, immigration has been amongst the top issues facing the country. It is currently the top issue of concern, mentioned by 41% of people, a slight dip from the peak of the refugee crisis, where it was spontaneously raised by 56% of UK adults. It isn’t a particularly divisive issue – whilst older, less well off, and more traditionally ‘right wing’ groups are most concerned, its salience crosses social grades, and voting intention: 64% of 2015 Conservative voters, and 75% of 2015 UKIP voters are joined by over a third of 2015 Labour and Lib Dem voters, who rank the issue in their top three.

Just for the avoidance of doubt, those who are concerned are unlikely to feel positive towards migrants: Oxford University’s Migration Observatory has shown that around 75% of the UK public favour reducing migration to the UK, with almost 60% advocating reducing it ‘a lot’. BritainThinks’ work reveals immigration is the lens through which almost every other political issue is considered. The diagnosis applies to congestion in A&E, the swelling benefits bill, struggling schools, and housing shortages to name but a few.

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Security and the EU

John Hayes MP on how being a member of the European Union affects Britain’s security

Figures released recently by the ONS revealed that 1.2 million more migrants from the EU have received National Insurance numbers in the past five years than are recorded in the overall figures for net migration from the EU. The disparity in these figures is largely accounted for by the fact that much of the migration from the EU to the UK is short-term. However, even though many people who come from the EU choose not to stay in the UK, the sheer scale of migration places great pressure on our infrastructure, hospital services and housing. Indeed, the movement of people across borders on such a scale puts enormous pressure on UK border security as well.

Regaining national control of our borders and the terms of entry to the UK would give us greater means of ensuring that someone entering our territory does not represent a threat.

As things presently stand, any citizen of an EU country can come to the UK. The Prime Minister’s renegotiation of our terms excluded a debate about the principle of free movement, not because he did not want it addressed, but because it is an inviolable principle of the political union of which we are currently a part. EU law dictates the terms of entry to the UK. Once a new immigrant has been properly registered in any of the 28 countries in the EU, they can move freely around the rest. Yet, the possession of an EU passport is no guarantee of propriety. As the former head of Interpol, Ronald Noble has pointed out, eight members of the EU are on Interpol’s top ten list of nations reporting stolen or lost passports.

It is not possible to absolutely guarantee security in a free society, but regaining national control of our borders and the terms of entry to the UK would give us greater means of ensuring that someone entering our territory does not represent a threat.

Some have argued that the risks inherent in free movement are more than offset by the security benefits resulting from cooperation between European states. However, it will continue to be in the interests of our European neighbours to cooperate with us on security matters whether we are in the EU or not. It is also abundantly clear that as the global threat of terrorism grows, other forums for international cooperation will become even more significant.

The Five Eyes (FVEYS) – an international alliance comprising the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – also plays a vital role in maintaining our security in a globalised world. Five Eyes evolved out of the close cooperation between the US and the Commonwealth during the Second World War, illustrating the continued significance of our connections well beyond the European continent.

It would be wrong to conclude that a vote to remain in the EU would be a vote for the status quo. The reality is that the increasing application of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights through decisions of the European Court of Justice is likely to have widespread implications on the way our intelligence and security services operate in the future.

The relentless ratchet of EU law, coupled with continued mass immigration from the EU, could mean that how we deal with migrants who have been deemed by our security services to present a threat becomes increasingly prescribed.

Voting to leave the EU would not in itself answer all the questions we face concerning mass migration and its implications for national security. It would, however, give us a greater control, a capacity to find the right answers while maintaining cooperation with security services from across the globe.
Stephen Booth is Co-Director of Open Europe

The battle lines in the EU referendum have become clearer. With the Remain camp seemingly ahead on the economic arguments, the Leave campaign has put the topic of immigration front and centre.

It has long been thought that tapping into public anxieties over immigration is the Leave camp’s best hope of victory. Public concerns about immigration are fuelled by many different issues, including greater pressure on public services, schools, housing and the impact of new low-skilled workers on wages at the lower end of the labour market.

It has long been thought that tapping into public anxieties over immigration is the Leave camp’s best hope of victory.

There is of course no denying that EU membership and the free movement of EU citizens means a certain loss of ‘control’ – a central Vote Leave campaign theme. However, this thorny subject will not be settled, whichever way the vote goes.

We’ve heard a vast range of different arguments. On the Leave side, proposals range from imposing stricter limits on EU immigration (and, in some cases, damn the economic consequences), to changing the mix of imported skills, or the unconventional gambit of allowing greater numbers of non-EU migrants to enter the UK. On the Remain side, high levels of immigration are either presented as the ‘price’ that must be paid to access the EU’s Single Market or the aggregate economic benefits of EU free movement are cited as prima facie evidence that it is inherently positive – despite the distributional effects and cultural sensitivities immigration clearly involves. Meanwhile, the Government maintains its ‘ambition’ to reduce immigration to the tens of thousands, without a credible plan.

How best to respond to these various competing strands? The uninspiring reality in either scenario is that there is little alternative to muddling through. There are limits to what any Government can reasonably achieve given the trade-offs involved.

While there would be political pressure to reduce immigration following a Brexit, there are several reasons why Government will struggle to find a workable strategy to reduce net immigration by much. Set against the public desire for lower immigration, businesses are already complaining of labour and skills shortages because the UK’s employment rate is currently at record highs. With the care of Britain’s ageing baby-boomers to pay for, migration also helps to lower the dependency ratio and improve the UK’s fiscal position, which would otherwise need to be funded via spending cuts, tax rises or increased productivity – all things any Government would find difficult.

Whatever happens on June 23rd, these are the issues that Governments can and should hope to do far more to address.

There is also likely to be a trade-off between the depth of any new economic agreement negotiated with the EU and the extent to which the UK will have to accept EU free movement. The UK might opt to emulate the points-based systems of Canada and Australia but the unspoken truth is that the experience of comparable, successful economies – whether they are subject to the EU’s free movement rules or not – illustrates that immigration is a fact of life for relatively prosperous and open economies in the 21st Century.

Similarly, if the UK remains in the EU, the fundamentals all point to continuing high inflows. The proposed reforms that would graduate EU migrants’ access to UK welfare address an important point of principle – that those hoping to benefit from moving to a new society must make a contribution first – and could discourage those who would move to the UK to work at lowest rungs of the labour market. However, the English language, a flexible labour market, and a comparably strong (and undervalued) record of integrating different cultures, means the UK is likely to remain a popular destination for other EU citizens.

The UK has been experiencing high levels of immigration since the late 1990s, from inside and outside the EU.

EU free movement is by definition difficult to control. But it is far more complicated than that. The UK has been experiencing high levels of immigration since the late 1990s, from inside and outside the EU. These people’s ties with their countries of origin are going to continue to drive immigration to the UK in one way or another. In addition, the UK economy is outgrowing many of our neighbours’ and unemployment is lower. These factors are impossible or undesirable to change. At the same time, many businesses complain about a lack of skills amongst British youngsters, while the public is concerned that investment in public services, housing and infrastructure has not kept pace and in some local areas integration is a challenge. Whatever happens on June 23rd, these are the issues that Governments can and should hope to do far more to address.
It is difficult to overstate the damage that has been done to UK politics and policy by the Prime Minister’s pledge – made against the advice of almost anyone who knew anything about the subject – to reduce net immigration to the tens of thousands. It has proved to be an act of economic self-harm; as well as unnecessarily excluding tens of thousands of skilled workers from outside the EU, we are actually losing global market share in a key export sector – higher education – where we have a strong comparative advantage. But it has also reduced trust in politics and politicians; voters are not stupid, and realise that the Prime Minister’s “no ifs, no buts” promise was simply empty. And it has, of course, handed a key attack line to the Brexit side in the referendum campaign, who quite correctly point out that as long as we remain in the EU, the target is simply pointless.

That’s the bad news. The good news is that the referendum, whichever way it goes, offers an opportunity for a fundamental reset of immigration policy. A frequent complaint of those who oppose either a liberal approach to migration in general, or free movement in the EU in particular, is that “you can’t talk about immigration”, or “the British people were never consulted on whether they wanted mass immigration”. Whatever the truth of these claims, they have considerable resonance.

Well, we’re talking about immigration now, and the British people are going to have their say. If we vote to stay in, we will have done so in full knowledge that staying entails a commitment to free movement of workers in the EU, both in principle and practice, and the resulting migration flows. We will have been consulted, and we will have said “yes”, albeit reluctantly, to free movement. And we will have rejected the idea that the “tens of thousands” target, appealing as many may find it in isolation, is actually a determining factor when it comes to the crunch of making a decision that actually affects jobs, wages and the country’s broader economic future. There could be no better time for the Government to ditch it and to move on – to formulating a policy that is actually in the UK’s economic interests, while dealing with the very real pressure on services at a local level that result from free movement.

Equally, if we vote to leave, we will have rejected that, and we can indeed “take control” of migration policy. The Leave campaign have set out a clear framework – equal treatment of EU and non-EU migrants, resulting in a large reduction of unskilled migration from the EU and a significant increase in skilled migration from outside the EU. More Indian engineers and fewer Hungarian doctors, as Steve Hilton put it. That is a coherent vision. But turning it into policy will require some hard choices. Will the Government simply say to sectors, from food processing to finance, who have come to rely on easy access to a flexible workforce, that they must simply adapt, even if there is a large economic cost? At a time when migration is still running at very high levels, will the promises made both to employers and some communities of a greatly liberalised approach to non-EU migration actually be honoured? And, assuming that some form of migration target remains, how will it be formulated?

Many economists are frustrated by how central the migration issue has been to the EU debate. Of course I’m biased, given my specialism in this area – but I think it’s an opportunity. We are having the debate we need, and after the referendum – whichever way it goes – perhaps we can get the policy we need.
So the day is upon us. The decision now has to be taken.

Four months after David Cameron returned from Brussels brandishing the proverbial bit of paper, Britain now has to decide: Remain or Leave. It’s been a battle with its bruises and its moments of extreme creativity. As a staunch Brexiteer, I still haven’t quite worked out the Remain campaign’s claim that if we leave, it will damage efforts to save the African elephant. I doubt that our decision will have much impact on poacher or protector alike.

But it’s also been a battle with a fundamentally serious core to it and a decision that ranks as high as any this country has taken in generations.

We’ve heard much about the risks of leaving. Our trade will plummet. Our economy will tank. Worth remembering though that it is only a couple of months since the Governor of the Bank of England warned that the biggest threat to the UK economy was the deteriorating situation in China. And that as recently as January, the Prime Minister was reassuring us that trade would carry on if we left.

And of course it will – we buy far more from them than they do from us – to the tune of £60 billion a year. In what world will the French Government tell their farmers – who take to the streets at a drop of a beret – that the price of their cheese, milk and wine is going to rise substantially in the UK, their biggest market. We all buy Somerset brie, and the French farmers will go out of business. No serious French politician would ever countenance that. Nor would the Germans when it comes to their car makers, for whom we are a crucial market. Trade will carry on, as it always does.

Then there have been the arguments over our total contribution of £350m a week to the EU. In fact, according to the ONS it is £367m, and after you deduct our rebate and the grants to farmers, universities and the regions (which we would carry on and pay directly) there’s still £10 billion a year that we never see again. As someone who has had to go through the pain of tough spending rounds, believe me that money could make a real difference to our priorities.

But to me, above all else, this referendum campaign is about control. Not just of our trade, though to me it is a nonsense that as lead country in the Commonwealth, we can do little to secure a modern, free trade deal with our Commonwealth partners. It’s about our ability to shape the future of our own nation.

The immigration issue has been at the heart of the campaign, and it is far from being the only one on which the decision should be made. But it is indicative of where we are as a nation. If we keep seeing current levels of migration, it will change our country for good.

We will see more and more green belt land disappear. Pressure on housing will become even greater than it is at present. Access to public services will become more difficult. While in the EU we have no ability to set limits on the number of people who come to live and work in the UK.

Perhaps most important though is the need to take back control of our democracy. The Eurozone is on a path towards political union. In the wake of the euro crisis they have no choice. They have to integrate to avoid a future collapse, and leaders from Angela Merkel to Jean-Claude Juncker are saying so.

That will leave us on the fringes, subject to European law but less and less able to influence it. We will not be able to look after our own national interests in an EU inevitably focused on the interests of its core members.

It’s no place for our country to be. We should be good friends and neighbours, but we are not part of their project, and we should stop trying to pretend we can be. It is time to follow a different path and vote to Leave.
Dear Philippe,

Immigration used to be a subject no one felt they could talk about; now the media talks of little else, but when people bring it up, they’re often discussing different things.

There is no such thing as an ‘immigrant’; the Huguenots’ story gives us almost no indication of how current migrants will fare in Britain, no more than the experience of one guest will tell us about future visitors. This is why I find things like last year’s ‘I am an immigrant’ poster campaign so bizarre.

Broadly speaking migration from other developed countries is beneficial, since the better educated and more dynamic tend to move from one country to another; but this generalisation about one form of migration has almost nothing in common with large scale movement from rural Pakistan or Somalia, an exodus that has led to entrenched separation which is unlikely to ever improve.

And the experience of immigration, from the natives’ point of view, almost entirely depends on where they live; my part of London is, by historical standards, very cosmopolitan, with dozens of languages spoken at my daughter’s school. But the area’s high housing costs ensure that it will never get that diverse, and the percentage of people who speak impeccable English never falls below a tipping point at which even the kindest of liberals begin to leave (as they do, at rates not far below that of self-identifying conservatives). The neighbourhood is protected by the high cost of moving there, and so trust is high. I would like others less fortunate to enjoy such protection too.

The experience of immigration, from the natives’ point of view, almost entirely depends on where they live

For those further down the social ladder mass immigration has had a negative impact on their lives, not just at a primary, local level, but also in the way it is pushing society. This is what is so puzzling about this issue: why so many on the Left continue to support an ideal that reduces social solidarity and aggravates social distinctions, and which moves us away from Sweden and closer to Brazil.

Regards,

Ed West

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Dear Ed,

Immigrants are generally good for Britain, precisely for the reason that makes them so controversial: they are different. Their differences tend to complement our own, making Britain richer both economically and culturally.

Some do jobs that Britons shun – such as pick strawberries, clean offices and care for the elderly, the area of fastest employment growth in Britain – enabling Britons to do jobs they prefer. Studies find no evidence that immigrants cost jobs or depress the wages of low-skilled Britons.

Others fill skills shortages, enhancing Britons’ productivity and wages. Hard-working Filipino nurses and British doctors together provide better care to more British patients.

Newcomers of all backgrounds are twice as likely to start a business as people born in Britain, creating jobs, wealth and new products and services. Tech City would be a hamlet without foreign entrepreneurs.

Migrants’ diverse perspectives and experiences help spark new ideas. People exposed to several cultures tend to be more creative, while diverse groups tend to outperform like-minded experts at problem solving. That’s why London is a both a magnet and a magnifier for talent.

Immigrants are also more likely to move again within Britain, making the economy more flexible.

Migrants are net contributors to public finances, enabling Britons to benefit from lower taxes and higher public spending than otherwise. Since they pay in more than they take out, any pressure on public services is due to the Government’s failings, not theirs. Immigrants also alleviate demographic ageing. Young migrant workers complement older, more experienced British ones and help pay for the growing ranks of pensioners. And newcomers help service Britain’s huge public debt. Since net public debt is around £20,000 per person, a 10% population increase reduces the burden on every Briton by £2,000.

Even immigration haters appreciate some of its cultural benefits: a wider choice of better restaurants, new music and art, sporting successes such as Mo Farah. Attitudes also tend to change over time. Young people find diversity normal. We should celebrate the diversity of modern Britain, which is a huge advantage in our globalised world.

Regards,

Philippe Legrain
Dear Philippe,

Many things are good in moderation but nothing is so in excess. All the arguments made for the positives of immigrants in general are arguments for selective migration. In particular, most of the success stories cited are of market dominant minorities - in our case Huguenots, Russian Jews and Ugandan Jews - who were persecuted in their homelands precisely because they were successful. But they are atypical of the 21st century migration story, especially in an age where intercontinental travel is accessible to millions if not billions.

Plenty of migrant groups across Europe and the United States are far from dynamic and continue to have worse educational and employment outcomes, Sweden being the most extreme example, where migration is cited for one-third of its dramatic drop in PISA scores. It depends on what type of immigration a country has.

At the higher level of the income or educational spectrum free movement is generally a bonus, especially in the world of science and academia, where ideas can be freely shared. But these realms also have their own barriers of talent, education and skill, which the outside world has not.

Without such hurdles, the social costs of mass migration can become very high, sometimes devastatingly so. Diversity makes life more interesting, or to use the most popular term, vibrant, but most people don’t want their lives to be vibrant after their adolescence has ended. They seek communities that are safe, friendly, egalitarian and inhabited by people like them with values like them.

Others do quite like this cosmopolitan churn, the world brought to their door. But they are small in number, especially if people’s revealed preferences are taken into account, and find it hard to understand why the rest of the country won’t catch up when diversity is obviously the future. But as a rule political ideas which sought to go against human nature do not have a terribly successful record.

Regards,
Philippe Legrain

Dear Ed,

The question before us is whether immigration is good for Britain. Only if it is selective, skilled and scarce, you argue. But since migration from the EU isn’t selective — any EU citizen can move here, for any reason — presumably it’s disastrous? Hardly. EU migrants have a higher employment rate (78.2%) than people born in the UK (72.3%), those from eastern Europe especially so (81.9%). And studies show that far from harming Britons, EU migrants make them better off.

Entry from outside the EU is ever more selective. But the huge flaw with such selective migration policies is that nobody knows how someone is going to end up contributing to Britain, let alone how their children will. By definition, new opportunities open up once people arrive. When the Ugandan Asians arrived, most people thought they would be a burden. Poorly educated Bangladeshis often set up Indian restaurants; these are now short of chefs – because their owners’ children tend to go to university and aspire to better things. You are particularly dismissive of Pakistanis. Have you noticed that the new mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, is the son of a Pakistani bus driver, as is the business secretary, Sajid Javid?

It’s also a misconception that while highly skilled migrants may be beneficial for Britain, less skilled ones aren’t. If the Government followed your advice, elderly immigrant-hating UKIP voters would soon lack carers, while East Anglian agricultural communities revitalised by hard-working eastern Europeans would wither.

And if migration to Britain is excessive, presumably the place that gets most of it – London – ought to be collapsing? Perhaps Clacton, which immigrants shun, is more successful?

You dislike diversity; there’s no pleasing everyone. But like it or not, we are all different. Indeed, while we are both white middle-class Britons who like writing, we have very different values. Since I have no desire to be more like you – and doubtless the feeling is mutual – we just need to rub along together. And the beauty of London is that we can.

Regards,
Philippe Legrain

Dear Philippe,

Of the 28,000 or so Ugandan Asians who settled in Britain, just 12% of those in the workforce were classed as ‘unskilled’. They were an overwhelmingly middle-class group, and if anyone thought they were going to be a burden to Britain they had never read an economics article, let alone a book.

In contrast, almost 50% of young second-generation Bangladeshis, are unemployed. This is not to be dismissive of Bangladeshis, or any other group, but while we can have no idea exactly how an individual migrant will fair, we can have a pretty good idea of the social impact overall if migration is not controlled.

It’s the job of policymakers to look at overall patterns rather than cite personal stories that are heroic but wildly unrepresentative, whether in sports (Mo Farah) business (Steve Jobs, from one of Syria’s richest families) or indeed politics.

Likewise with European immigration: there are more Germans in Britain than there are Romanians, yet almost eight times as many Romanians as Germans in British jails. Again this is not a slight on Romanians, but the typical profile of a migrant from a rich country is different to the typical profile of one from a poor or middle-income country.

Most European migrants are young, fit and working, and so go to where the jobs are – there are fewer employment prospects in Clacton than London, funnily enough – but time will catch
up with them too, as it does with all of us, which is why I find the logic of immigrants easing the burden of care so strange. Many people are particularly stung by immigrant-bashing rhetoric because they have seen elderly or disabled relatives cared for by migrants or minorities. I can understand that. I just find it odd that compassion for one outsider group is coupled with a strange (because it is so common on the Left) contempt for another one, of those who don’t wish to share in this exciting new multi-cultural future.

Regards,
Ed West

Dear Ed,
In fact, Ugandan Asians were not initially welcomed in Britain. The Government tried to send them elsewhere. Leicester council took out newspaper ads warning them not to come. The media called them “parasites” or worse. Yet now even you celebrate their contribution to Britain.

It’s the job of policymakers to look at overall patterns rather than cite personal stories that are heroic but wildly unrepresentative

Misplaced fears about foreigners are nothing new. The Huguenots were attacked by angry mobs. The Government brought in the country’s first immigration restrictions, the Aliens Act of 1905, to keep out Jews. Post-war migrants were greeted with signs saying “No dogs. No blacks. No Irish”.

This time is different, you claim: apart from highly skilled migrants from rich countries, the newcomers really are bad for Britain. Except the evidence suggests they aren’t. Just because some people blame their personal misfortune or everything they dislike about modern Britain on immigrants doesn’t make it true. If people’s prejudices are unfounded, it is unhelpful and patronising, not compassionate, to wrongly validate them. Clacton’s real problem is deprivation, not immigration. Migrants help make London such a success.

You raised crime. An LSE study found that areas that received more east European migrants had lower property crime than elsewhere. Violent crime was unaffected. East Europeans are no more likely than Britons to end up in prison.

Or take healthcare. An Oxford University study finds that NHS waiting times are lower in areas with more migrants. Migrants are often young and healthy, while even older ones are less likely to see a doctor than a typical Brit. Also, more than one in four NHS doctors is foreign.

Your cultural determinism is unwarranted. In writing off migrants from certain countries or without certain skills, you wrongly assume human potential is knowable and predetermined. Yet that is demonstrably nonsense for people born in Britain, let alone for the self-selected minority of foreigners who are enterprising enough to uproot themselves, gain new opportunities when they arrive here and have every incentive to work hard to better themselves.

Regards,
Philippe Legrain
Economic lessons

Professor Ian Preston on the economic benefits of immigration

Ian Preston is Professor of Economics at University College London

Economic migration within the EU attracts little public sympathy. It is often seen as at best a regrettably unavoidable consequence of trade arrangements, at worst a serious danger to the economy. Yet the economic case for a relaxed view of free movement within the EU is strong.

The ability of firms to recruit widely geographically for the skills they need is good for productive efficiency, taking best advantage of people’s willingness to get on their bikes and look for work. If there are skill shortages then firms can find appropriate labour to fill skill gaps and workers can supply labour wherever their particular abilities are in highest demand. Firms gain from access to the broadest pool of skills for their operations and workers gain from access to the broadest pool of employers for their skills.

Labour mobility also provides insurance against local labour market fluctuations. If there is a downturn in one region and an upturn elsewhere then movement of workers between them will dampen the effects.

Firms gain from access to the broadest pool of skills for their operations and workers gain from access to the broadest pool of employers for their skills

Labour movement also spreads innovation and entrepreneurship. Freedom to move to where one’s ideas are most valued ensures innovations are developed and new ideas reach broader audiences. Freedom for the best minds to come together heightens the rate of new discoveries.

Advanced as arguments for labour migration within a country, these seem uncontroversial. Why then is the idea of economic migration between countries of the EU rather than within the UK so unpopular?

The ability of firms to recruit widely geographically for the skills they need is good for productive efficiency

Perhaps we need to ask who benefits from it. Of course, the largest beneficiaries are migrants themselves who can increase incomes considerably by migrating. The effects on the immobile are potentially more mixed. That is not to say, however, that they are uniformly or even mainly negative. Inward migration of labour is beneficial to those whose skills are complementary to newly arriving labour. If migrants bring capital with them, encouraging firms to set up or remain where they arrive, then that too should benefit other local workers. But those whose skills are in closest competition with those of immigrants may lose out.

What does the evidence say about the labour market effects of immigration to the UK? Immigrants are typically better-educated than those locally born. Nonetheless they tend to work, at least at first, for wages more associated with lower education levels, presumably because it takes time to learn locally specific skills like language competence. Comparing regions with different rates of immigrant inflow, there is little evidence to justify concern about labour market outcomes. No reliable evidence points to harmful effects on employment. Even those who have found indications that wages may be constrained at certain thresholds argue that such effects are small, probably short term and more than counterbalanced by wage gains to others.

Where else then might harmful economic effects be found to justify anti-immigrant sentiment? A frequently expressed concern is that immigration threatens public finances. Generous welfare provision and attractive entitlement rules could, in theory, draw in migrants prepared to exploit them to their own advantage in a way that compromises the viability of public provision. However, these concerns need to be backed up by evidence – and that evidence is lacking. Migrants are young, come to work and not only claim benefits at no higher rate than the locally born, but are also no less healthy and no more criminal so pose no obvious insupportable burden on other public services. Furthermore, they arrive after school age so their skills contribute to the labour market without public funding for their education.

Immigrants are typically better-educated than those locally born... They tend to work for wages more associated with lower education levels, presumably because it takes time to learn locally specific skills like language competence

Once tax payments are balanced against the cost of public services consumed, the best evidence we have suggests that recent immigrants, and particularly those from within the EU, have contributed positively to the public exchequer at a time of large public deficits. Migration undoubtedly poses problems of adjustment in the public sector but it also generates funds which reduce costs for everyone.

All things considered, the economic case for concern over EU immigration is weak. On the contrary, its positive impacts should be celebrated and the Government should focus attention on ensuring the gains are spread widely.
Strains on our schools?

James Johnson on how schools can help bridge community divisions

Our school system faces a steep challenge from high levels of migration, but schools can also bring our divided communities together.

Recent large increases in the level of migration into the UK have created an unprecedented challenge for our schools. Research shows that, in 2013–2014 alone, 38,000 children of primary school age entered England, more than double the number just three years previous. With no signs of slowing, and pressure for places already high with a growing population, such sharp increases are having a transformative impact on our education system.

Evidence shows that there is little effect on the performance of other children in schools with high migrant populations, and migrant pupils tend to do significantly better academically than their classmates.

That is not to suggest that the impact of migration on schools is necessarily negative. Evidence shows that there is little effect on the performance of other children in schools with high migrant populations, and migrant pupils tend to do significantly better academically than their classmates. Our schools also shine at teaching children who do not have English as a first language. Last year, for example, over 83% of children without English as their mother tongue achieved the expected standard in reading, writing and maths by the age of seven.

However, regardless of the arguments over immigration and its rights and wrongs, or the extent to which it should be controlled, schools and teachers in certain parts of the country already face a significant and very real challenge. The pure demand for school places poses an immediate problem. Unlike some European countries, England is bucking the trend of falling fertility rates. Population growth is especially pronounced at school age, with sharp increases in the primary and secondary populations already expected in certain areas. Some urban hotspots in England face a triple whammy – high natural population growth, increases in migration rates, and few school places to go round.

As pupil rolls swell, expansion is an obvious answer. But too many poor schools are growing. Recent research by the New Schools Network showed that over 100,000 places have been created in struggling schools over the last five years. In order to truly address the problem, we need to open good, new schools. Free schools – as the only way to create new schools in England – provide a solution. They are more likely to be rated Outstanding, will soon have created more than a quarter of a million school places, and – since they put teachers and community leaders in the driving seat – they are more attuned to the needs of their local communities.

The performance of pupils of all ethnic groups is weaker in the most divided communities, such as Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester and Blackburn. We need to turn our attention to such areas and work to encourage more cross-community and cross-cultural collaboration. More interaction between schools is needed, through multi-racial and multi-faith initiatives, as well as working to dispel myths about migration amongst white British pupils, recently spearheaded by the brilliant Red Cross ‘Positive Images’ project.

We need to turn our attention to such areas and work to encourage more cross-community and cross-cultural collaboration.

But schools in and of themselves can bring children together. New free schools, which have more control over their catchment areas, can attract pupils from a range of backgrounds and faiths. Some have already done so, with the charity behind the Big Issue, Big Life, bringing together pupils of different backgrounds at their primary school in Manchester. Free schools are already the most ethnically diverse type of school, and can help to bridge divisions in communities. Proposals by the New Schools Network to create a new category of ‘social need’ in the free schools application process, in order to more easily open free schools in areas where schools may be perpetuating community division, would allow this cross-collaboration to grow and foster real diversity in our most divided cities.

The way to bring together our communities, as well as to properly meet the challenges of migration, lies with and within our education system. Schools, teachers, and policymakers must now rise to the challenge.

Some of the hotspots of population growth are highly segregated, and schools all too often reflect and slot into this pattern. This lets everyone down, including schoolchildren.
The New Labour years

Professor Nick Pearce on how the last Labour Government sought to address immigration and what we can learn from it

Immigration barely featured in the 1997 Labour manifesto. New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better contained only two short paragraphs on the issue, squeezed between legal aid reform and the Northern Ireland peace process. Public disquiet about immigration barely registered in the political debate that accompanied Labour’s landslide return to power.

Beneath the surface of politics, however, deeper currents of change were underway. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, asylum claims in Western Europe had started to rise, particularly in Germany. Movement across the European continent became easier: in the mid-1990s, the Schengen area came into force and border controls were abolished across much of the European mainland. Brutal civil war in the former Yugoslavia drove refugees northwards in search of safety. Steady economic growth started to pull in migrants too. Employment levels rose in the UK, and employers began to voice demands for skilled labour to fill shortages.

**Public disquiet about immigration barely registered in the political debate that accompanied Labour’s landslide return to power**

Labour enacted controversial asylum and immigration reforms in its first term, which registered the arrival of these issues into the mainstream of politics. But it was only in its second term that they started to reach the top of the public agenda. In the early years of the 21st century, asylum claims hit new peaks, swelled by Afghans, Kurds, Zimbabweans and Somalis fleeing war, persecution and state failure. A Red Cross centre was established at Sangatte in the Pas de Calais to house those seeking clandestine entry to the UK via the channel tunnel and northern French ports. Their attempts to stowaway in lorries and on trains became a regular feature of the broadcast news bulletins and tabloid press.

Labour’s response to the rise in asylum seekers was threefold (full disclosure: I was an adviser to the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett, between 2001 and 2003). First, it sought to deter and deal rapidly with unfounded asylum claims through a series of administrative and legal reforms. Second, it opened up new channels for legal economic migration, in order to meet labour market needs and prevent clandestine entry to the UK for the purposes of work. Third, it attempted to give new meaning and content to the acquisition of British citizenship, through civic education, tests and ceremonies, and English language courses. To tackle public disquiet about the scenes in Calais, it negotiated a bilateral deal with the French Government to move UK border controls to Northern France, strengthen tunnel security and close the Sangatte camp.

These reforms succeeded in bringing down asylum claims. But large sections of the British public, particularly amongst older working class voters, remained unmoved. Labour’s hope had been that if it could show the country that migration and asylum were properly managed, with legal entry routes to employment, then public hostilities would be assuaged. (This had nothing whatever to do with “imposing multiculturalism”, as has been claimed; that is an utterly absurd and false argument.) Yet with the opening up of the UK labour market to nationals of the “A8” countries of Eastern Europe, concerns about asylum seekers simply shifted to Polish migrants. Although all the economic evidence shows that this wave of migration was largely positive, the scale of change was such to generate widespread public concern. By 2010, Labour had rethought its approach: transitional controls had been imposed on labour market rights of Romanians and Bulgarians, and a points system for non-EU migration introduced.

What should we learn from this experience? First, it is clear that the UK was not alone in experiencing significant net inward migration in the period running up to the financial crisis and beyond. Almost all advanced capitalist economies – notably the USA, Australia and other Anglosphere countries – received large flows of migrants over the same period; it therefore was not simply a function of the free movement of people within the EU. High inward migration has become a new steady state in much of the developed world.

This makes it unlikely that the Government’s net migration target will be met any time soon, whether the UK stays in the EU or not

This makes it unlikely that the Government’s net migration target will be met any time soon, whether the UK stays in the EU or not. Insofar as this drives policy, it is self-defeating, leading the Government to cut the numbers of students and highly skilled workers coming to the UK, for instance. But it also undermines public trust, by virtue of setting a goal for policy that will not be achieved. In that regard it suffers from a flaw that bedevilled Labour’s policy framework: the belief that concerns about immigration can be addressed by
managing the system better, rather than addressing the everyday experience of interaction between migrants and the communities they join.

Migration policy should pay far more attention to integration, and the local agencies capable of promoting it, principally local authorities and their partners. In migration policy, localism and integration go together, but neither has been properly developed or resourced. For all the major parties, the electoral realities of the future point to patient strategies of forging shared local and national patriotic identities in which new arrivals and the so-called ‘left behind’ can each find recognition. Divisive anti-immigrant politics in the service of eurosceptic goals make that task far harder.

**Future flows**

**Sam Bowman** on the financial forces shaping migration patterns

As incomes rise in poor countries, so too does the ability of poor workers to migrate. As incomes rise in the developing world we should expect more and more would-be migrants who want to come to the rich world to improve their lot in life.

The accession of the former communist states to the European Union, beginning in 2004, has generated a large movement of workers from eastern to western Europe. Since 2008, the poor economic performance of the Mediterranean EU states has created a migration from south to north. Civil wars in Syria and North Africa have generated large numbers of refugees, and also created areas through which migrants from other countries can travel to Europe. Most of this is economic migration. This is driven by income imbalances – when a worker can earn substantially more in a new country than they can in their home country – and constrained by incomes, family and social ties, and the risks involved with moving country.

The economist Branko Milanovic has observed that between 50% and 65% of income differences between people globally are due to differences between the countries they live in. A low-skilled worker in a country like Bangladesh can typically expect to multiply her earnings by between ten and twenty times by moving to the UK, even doing the same job. Although the wage differential is much smaller between EU countries, an average Polish worker can still expect to improve her earnings by a factor of about three times by moving to the UK. A lack of jobs means that a similar differential exists for many young workers in the Mediterranean Eurozone states, even though GDP per capita differences are smaller.

The Eastern European states are growing faster on average than the Western European states, in large part because they are starting from a lower base. As this ‘catch up’ growth reduces income differences between European states, the income premium will shrink too, reducing Polish workers’ incentive to travel to the UK for work. We should thus expect a slow decline in the rate of migration from East to West, eventually looking similar to the much lower migration levels between, say, Germany and the UK.

As ‘catch up’ growth reduces income differences between European states, the income premium will shrink too, reducing Polish workers’ incentive to travel to the UK for work.

In the much nearer term, we should expect Eurozone migration to slow, as the economies of these countries return to full employment. Much of the recent spike in EU immigration to the UK was driven by the Euro crisis, which surely cannot go on forever. It is non-EU immigration that is likely to grow and grow in importance over the next few decades, as poor people increasingly become able to afford to migrate, whether legally or illegally.

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We cannot predict civil wars – ten years ago few people expected Syria to be a major source of refugees in the mid-2010s – but in economic terms it will be a very long time before living standards in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent are anything like what they are in the developed world. Population growth in these regions is also strong and the age profile of Africa in particular is very young, meaning that there are lots of young men and women who want to improve their lives by moving countries to work.

Whether the UK chooses to fight this or adapt to it is a question that we will eventually have to answer. Perhaps the best adaptation may be to recognise that these waves of economic migration are just that – that future migration policy is not about making a new generation of Britons, but about establishing a trading relationship with workers from around the world that works for both us and them.
Why I’m a Bright Blue MP

Robin Walker MP on Bright Blue’s values and optimism

Pragmatism, not ideology, should drive Conservative thinking and balancing efficiency with compassion is a good starting point for what we are here for. Optimism for our fellow man and ambition for our communities should be at the heart of what we do.

Bright Blue is optimistic about human potential and I see this optimism reflected in the Government’s National Living Wage, the drive for millions more apprentices and the tackling of the disability employment gap.

In unleashing the enormous potential of every individual and strengthening the bonds of family and community, we set to work profoundly conservative values which can be radical in their outcomes. Bright Blue recognises this in its focus on lifelong education, its valuing of family and in its focus on the contribution which all individuals – including immigrants – are capable of making to society and the lives of others.

In a fast changing world, individuals are at risk of becoming alienated, isolated and demoralised by forces they feel they cannot control. It is the role of One Nation Conservatives to bring people together and to find new ways of strengthening the bonds of society.

We have taken strides in the last three decades in better supporting and recognising those with disabilities but we need to go further.

Bright Blue is optimistic about human potential and I see this optimism reflected in the Government’s National Living Wage, the drive for millions more apprentices and the tackling of the disability employment gap. We have taken strides in the last three decades in better supporting and recognising those with disabilities but we need to be further. New ways of working, better understanding and the power of assistive technology can help millions more people with physical disabilities, mental health problems and learning difficulties to live more productive, engaged and empowered lives. This will only happen however if Government focuses on its role to support and enable.

The focus on Life Chances in the Prime Minister’s electrifying conference speech last year was an endorsement of Bright Blue’s approach as well as of other thoughtful groups such as the CSJ. Enabling every child to look forward to a rich and varied life means strengthening the family and finding new ways to address family breakdown. MPs who hold regular surgeries know only too well the difficulties that arise when well-intentioned top down policy collides with the reality of chaotic lives.

We need to recognise the potential of the state to be a catalyst for the small battalions that exist in all our communities and have the expertise and the passion to engage with families and people individually.

In a fast changing world, individuals are at risk of becoming alienated, isolated and demoralised by forces they feel they cannot control. It is the role of One Nation Conservatives to bring people together and to find new ways of strengthening the bonds of society.

Since 2015, working with the Conservative education team, it has been a pleasure to see the real passion every one of them have for transforming life chances. Delivering quality affordable childcare, fair and rational funding for all our schools, better supported and swifter adoption, devolved and empowered leadership for headteachers, a Twenty First Century curriculum and the best quality teaching of any generation. None of these are optional; all are necessary for Britain to achieve its potential.
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Going green, globally

Sam Hall on the link between climate change and migration

Prince Charles caused great controversy last year when he linked the Syrian refugee crisis to climate change. He based his comments on a peer-reviewed study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, which claimed that the severe drought in Syria between 2006 and 2010 was made more likely by climate change. The academics argued that the drought displaced thousands of Syrians from the countryside, exacerbating social tensions and contributing to the outbreak of civil war in Syria. The study was not met with universal support, with critics questioning the secondary claims linking the drought to the Syrian uprising.

What is less controversial is that climate change makes extreme weather events more likely

What is less controversial is that climate change makes extreme weather events more likely. Evidence from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and elsewhere shows that global warming has already led to an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters such as floods and droughts, and will make them more likely in the future. This in turn will drive population migration, as people are forced to flee areas that are no longer habitable.

The link between climate change and migration can be overstated, however. The UK Climate Change and Migration Coalition argues that much of this migration will be internal and temporary, with people returning to their homes once the extreme weather event and its after-effects have subsided. It’s also incorrect to assume that all these natural disasters are caused by climate change. Climate change simply makes them more likely. Even greater scepticism is required about the link between conflict and climate change. Research by the World Bank finds little evidence of any causal connection.

Climate migration is a subject prone to hyperbole. Several years ago, the academic Norman Myers claimed that there could be 200 million climate refugees by 2050. His projections were even quoted approvingly in UN publications. Yet we already know that his short-term predictions are false. He estimated that by 2010 there would be 50 million refugees displaced through climate change. However, the total number of forced displacements from all causes in 2010, according to the UN, was just 44 million people. Myers has been criticised for making crude assumptions. For instance, he assumes that everyone in an area vulnerable to rising sea levels will become displaced. The evidence that climate change will increase the number of environmental refugees is strong. But the argument has often attracted scorn because of these sorts of alarmist assertions.

Tackling global climate change then, can help reduce the number of environmental refugees. This is obviously and primarily good for the victims of these natural disasters, who would not be driven involuntarily from their homes and deprived of their livelihoods. But it is also good for European Governments, such as ours, which are currently engaged in devising policies to address migrant influxes.

At the Paris climate summit in December 2015, the UK was a key member of the ‘high ambition coalition’, which lobbied for tougher limits on emissions. The eventual deal committed countries to limiting temperature rises to two degrees above pre-industrial levels and to reducing net global emissions to zero in the second half of this century. This historic agreement was only possible because developing countries were promised $100 billion of annual financial assistance from developed countries to make the low-carbon transition. Britain is playing its role in delivering this funding, by increasing our international climate fund to £3.8 billion between 2016 and 2021. Much of the funding goes to poor, low-lying islands to help them adapt to rising sea levels with coastal protection measures. Some of it also assists developing countries build renewable energy infrastructure.

The evidence that climate change will increase the number of environmental refugees is strong. But the argument has often attracted scorn because of these sorts of alarmist assertions.

International aid in general and international climate aid in particular are not always cheered in the right-wing media. There’s an opportunity for the Government to garner more support for this agenda if they contextualise it within public concerns about the migrant crisis. The rationale of helping vulnerable countries undergo the transition to low-carbon economies isn’t persuasive enough for many. But linking climate aid to migration prevention would be a more popular framing. This sort of rhetorical shift is already happening, with the Government launching a new strategy last year justifying aid in terms of the national interest. There is growing evidence of the connection between climate change and migration. This should be leveraged to win precious public support for the 0.7% commitment.
Bright Blue research update

James Dobson updates us on Bright Blue’s research programme

Amidst the whirlwind of the EU referendum campaigns, peppered as they have been with hysteria on both sides, Bright Blue has been keeping a steely focus on our core policy areas: education and social policy, energy and environment, human rights and immigration and integration.

You will notice that Europe isn’t one of them. Back in February, we published Standing alone? Self-employment for those on low income. The number of people choosing to become self-employed is up, but earnings from self-employment are down. As our research demonstrated, this is leading to an important, and growing constituency of self-employed, low income individuals. We found that this group struggle with income volatility, limited access to state benefits and accessing advice and training and so recommended a number of policies to support them more effectively in these areas.

In March we launched an essay collection on Conservatism and human rights. At the heart of conservatism is a belief in individual freedom, especially from an overreaching state. Yet human rights have a bad reputation. This essay collection addressed this with new positive thinking about how the new British Bill of Rights can strengthen human rights, the importance of advancing human rights in British foreign policy and tackling discrimination.

Just a few weeks ago, we published Keeping the lights on: security of supply after coal. This report examines whether the Government will be able to phase out coal from the UK’s energy mix in time to meet its 2025 deadline. Furthermore, it estimates how much additional new gas-generating capacity will be required to guarantee security of supply. We think the Government can and should be more ambitious and bring forward the phase out date by at least two years.

Very shortly we will publish an essay collection on the future of London with Localis. London is a booming, global city, but what will the future hold? We have a gathered range of contributors to explore the future of London’s business, culture, education, environment and other spheres, with new ideas for the London of 2050.

There will be more research on energy. Following the Government’s decision to withdraw funding from the Green Deal Finance Company, there is now a lack of policies to incentivise home energy efficiency improvements. Yet according to the Committee on Climate Change, further policies are required to meet decarbonisation targets for domestic heat. We will be publishing research with new answers and fresh thinking on this issue.

We have two pieces of work forthcoming on integration. First, a report exploring the history of Muslim integration in the UK, the successes and failures and what we can learn from this today. Second, we are working on the topic of citizenship. Worryingly, citizenship grants are falling and there are a number of challenges facing the system. We will be looking to pick them out.

Last but not least, we are dipping our toe into the housing debate with a report on private renters. This will explore the characteristics private renters and suggest ideas for the what the future holds for this growing group.
The *Centre Write* interview: Richard Harrington MP, Minister for Syrian Refugees

Richard Mabey discussed the ongoing refugee crisis with the new Minister for Syrian Refugees.

The Government is committed to taking 20,000 Syrian refugees by 2020. Could you explain what types of individuals will be prioritised?

The refugees are selected exclusively on the grounds of vulnerability and all of them through The UN refugee agency, the UNHCR. There are criteria including, for example, whether they have been victims of torture or victims of sexual violence. These are Syrian families who have fled to the countries next to Syria. Contrary to what is often reported, the majority of these families are not from camps, though they are all under UNHCR protection. Only about 30% are in what we would call a camp. The remainder reside in towns, villages and fields.

How does being in the European Union affect our ability to respond to the migrant flows into Europe that we are witnessing?

We are outside of Schengen and we are not participating in any EU system for distributing refugees.

Having stated that Britain would not take child migrants from Europe, the Government recently announced that it would do so. What prompted this change?

Up till now it has been predominantly refugee families we have taken. The reason we are taking some unaccompanied children who have reached Europe is due to an amendment to the Immigration bill. These children will come mainly from France, Greece and Italy. Ideally though, we prefer to bring in families through the scheme because it is better for the children. The child has more protection having people from their own culture. We are also conscious of the strains which admitting unaccompanied
There is a real focus at the moment on the integration of new migrants, not only economically but socially as well. Are we doing enough to support the integration of refugees or individuals admitted through the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPR) in Britain?

Crucially, the VPR scheme has funding for integration. For example, helping individuals into work, English language lessons. We are also relying on the good will of many voluntary organisations who have offered to help.

I’m hoping that the VPR will be the first resettlement scheme which will focus on getting people into employment. In my experience of speaking to refugees, they all want to get into work as soon as they can. They do not come from a benefits cultures and they are desperate to get into work – they just need some support. We’ve launched a pilot scheme in this area in Bradford which is showing encouraging early results.

In terms of social integration, our approach is focused on trying to ensure refugees are spread across different parts of the country, not ghettoising them. It is sometimes suggested that resettlement of refugees tends to result in them being concentrated in a few areas. We are trying to stop that happening. This is the best way to ensure they become involved in the community.

Of the first VPR cohort, approximately 1,000 individuals, every child who was eligible to be in school was in school by January. It is clear that refugees really value education for their children and that will drive social and community engagement.

The levels of migration into Europe we have seen recently have been exceptional. Looking forward to the years ahead, do you think that these levels will be sustained? Are we witnessing the new normal?

I don’t believe this is a new normal at all. History shows that periodically this happens. There was a significant flow of migrants after the Second World War, and also during parts of the nineteenth century with migrants moving to the United States. I don’t think the current levels will be sustained.

What is interesting from a historical perspective is how we are responding. Today, the Government’s policy is to do most of our humanitarian efforts in the region in question, and have a small number of the most vulnerable refugees brought to this country. I think this will become the model for the future.●

Keeping the lights on: Security of supply after coal
Ben Caldecott

This is our first report from our new Green Conservatism project.

The Government has announced that it will phase out the use of coal in electricity generation by the mid-2020s, making the UK the first country to use coal for electricity generation and now the first developed country to phase it out completely. Since the announcement, however, there has been concern about the implications for the UK’s energy security as coal is removed from the grid.

This report analyses the impact of the coal phase-out on the power system, the demand for gas, the UK’s emissions targets and households bills. The lights will stay on. In fact, the report argues that is feasible and desirable to phase-out coal earlier than currently planned.
Matchmaking

Alex Teytelboym and Will Jones propose a new approach to placing refugees

When policymakers talk about refugee protection, they tend to focus on headline numbers. In Britain one of these numbers is 20,000. That is, in September 2015 David Cameron promised to resettle 20,000 Syrian refugees in Britain by 2020. The public debate has thus far focused on whether this number is too low or high. But irrespective of what this number actually is, a further pressing question is where in Britain these vulnerable refugees are going to settle.

There is considerable evidence from Sweden, which has allocated resettled refugees across the country almost randomly since 1985, that the initial destination of refugees within a country matters enormously for their lifetime outcomes. Provision of social housing means that refugees often stay where they are placed for a long time. Yet, as things stand, no Government takes into account the preferences of refugees over where in the host country they wish to settle. Most well-meaning national resettlement bureaucracies attempt to place refugee families where they are deemed to be most likely to thrive: perhaps near their existing family or in a place where their medical needs are met. This puts enormous pressure on resettlement workers to second-guess or figure out where best
to place refugees and inadvertently pushes them into making arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. At the same time, local authorities which are willing to host refugees simply get a take-them-or-leave-them offer from the central Government. They are not able to find refugee families that they are most capable providing for and that would be happy to live in that area.

Matching market theory can tell a lot about how we ought to match Syrian refugees to local authorities in Britain

The following analogy is helpful in understanding how refugees are currently handled. Imagine what sort of chaos would ensue if the Government tried to second-guess which school parents want to send their children to and then allocated these children according to some criteria it deemed appropriate. There would be many unhappy children and parents as well as a lot of frustrated teachers. Of course, in the case of schools, we implemented a straightforward solution: children and their parents are asked to rank schools according to their first, second, third (and so on) choices and schools have well-defined priorities over the sort of children are they supposed to admit. For example, children who live nearby or have a sibling in the school have high priority. This information is fed into a system that proposes an allocation. In fact, the design of the system is circumscribed by an Act of Parliament and ensures that parents have no incentive to cheat the system. The design of the algorithm that matches children to schools is guided by what is known as “matching market theory” and its applications are just about everywhere: from living donor kidney exchange to the matching of junior doctors to hospitals for residency.

Matching market theory can tell a lot about how we ought to match Syrian refugees to local authorities in Britain. A matching system would collect information from the two sides of the “market”: the local authorities and the refugees. The local authorities would report what services and capacities they have – how much housing, how many hospital beds, how many school places – as well as rank refugee families according to how well they can host them using clear vulnerability criteria. While the refugees are going through the asylum application process abroad, they would be offered a chance to rank local authorities that can meet their needs. The matching mechanism tries to ensure that the proposed allocation would be feasible (no service capacities are violated), efficient (no refugee family can make themselves better off without making some other family worse off) and safe for refugees to report their preferences honestly. The matching system could be run every few months to ensure as many apt matches as possible and the indicative outcomes would be reported to the Home Office.

The Local Refugee Match will not help any more refugees than the Government has already agreed to help. But we hope that the transparency and the effectiveness of the system would encourage more local authorities to participate (since they only do so currently on a voluntary basis) in resettling refugees. Most importantly, however, the Local Refugee Match will give agency and dignity to those refugees coming to Britain, ensure that their needs and preferences are met and give them the best chance in starting their new life here. Pioneering the Local Refugee Match would make the British Government the most progressive and effective refugee host nation in the world.
International commitments

Diane Sheard on why addressing the refugee crisis must not come at the expense of ending extreme poverty

Conflict has long been a reason for migration, and today the Syrian conflict is the biggest single source of refugees, with 4.8 million people moving to or through its neighbouring countries so far, including hundreds of thousands heading to Europe. The conflict has left 6.6 million people displaced inside Syria itself. However, while the steep increase in arrivals on Europe’s shores has dominated the headlines, developing countries actually take the greatest strain in hosting refugees. In fact, developing countries host over 86% of the world’s refugees, and Sub-Saharan Africa is home to more than 27% or four million of them. Most of these refugees are living in low-income countries such as Chad, Uganda and Ethiopia. The Dadaab refugee settlement in Kenya is the largest in the world and has been around for almost 25 years. Bleakly referred to as a “permanent temporary solution”, it is home to 345,000 people, nearly a third of whom were born there and have never known the place their parents call home.

The migration crisis therefore clearly isn’t just European; it’s global. And it’s not just about guaranteeing the rights of refugees fleeing the horror of war, but also about longer-term development.

There are worrying new trends of countries pitting these two issues against each other. Some of the advanced economies that make up the OECD Development Assistance Committee – the global body that ensures aid is spent effectively and reaches those who need it most – have been raiding their longer-term development budgets to provide for refugees within their own countries. This means that not only are countries such as Sweden becoming the biggest recipients of their own overseas aid, they are diverting funds away from programmes intended to help the world’s poorest people lift themselves out of poverty. These programmes include delivering vaccines, training teachers, securing peace, promoting good governance, and creating jobs. In fact, in 2015 the share of aid spent on refugees within donor countries more than doubled from 2014 in real terms to £8.3 billion (and more than quintupled compared to 2008).

There are clear policy choices for Governments, and some countries have proven that it’s possible to provide for refugees without raiding development budgets.

Germany is funding its domestic refugee costs in addition to its overseas aid budget; and France, this year, has increased its budget for both. The UK proudly invests 0.7% of our national income in overseas aid, and is one of the biggest supporters of the United Nations’ humanitarian agencies. Wealthy countries can and must do both.

There are clear policy choices for Governments, and some countries have proven that it’s possible to provide for refugees without raiding development budgets.

Last year, in its new UK Aid Strategy, the Government committed to invest 50% of the Department for International Development’s budget in fragile and conflict affected states and regions.

Half of all British aid should be invested in the world’s least developed countries

Given the clear links between extreme poverty and fragility, this policy has some merit. However, we must ensure that the Government remains honest and ensures that much-respected UK aid is deployed for its true purpose: ending poverty. Half of all British aid should be invested in the world’s least developed countries: those with the hardest development challenges and where aid is especially important because domestic resources (such as tax receipts) are limited and private sources (such as Foreign Direct Investment) are still low.

When ComRes polled the UK public on their attitudes to overseas aid last year, 77% of Brits agreed that Members of Parliament should ensure that the UK keeps its promises to the world’s poorest, and 66% agreed that most UK aid should go to countries that have the least. The Prime Minister should therefore use the UK’s strong international reputation on development to protect the true purpose of aid of eliminating poverty and at the same time support refugees who give up everything because they cannot build a life in the place they are running from.
Compassion and control:
a Conservative response to the refugee crisis

David Burrowes MP on how the Government has risen to the challenge of responding to the refugee crisis

The refugee crisis moved the public imagination early in September when the photo of Aylan Kurdi tragically washed up on that Turkish shore went viral on social media. The story provided the human face of the appalling statistic that on average every day, two children lose their life fleeing the Syrian and North African region. The Government’s response up until then was to defend its proud record of humanitarian aid. We have now pledged £2.3 billion in humanitarian aid for Syria, as well as £65 million to help tackle the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Our priority should be to support refugees and displaced people in the region of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. If people don’t see a future in this region, they will continue to take the risks and costs of travelling to Europe.

But our response does not and should not end with international aid. Last summer I called on the Government to do more and show more compassion for the most vulnerable refugees who need sanctuary away from the region. I am proud that our Government can also now defend its record on resettlement of refugees. Over 5,500 Syrians (including 3,000 children) have been granted asylum or other forms of leave in Britain since 2011. We have now resettled around 1,800 of the 20,000 refugees, whom the Prime Minister has committed to give refuge by 2020. Finally, last month the Government established a world leading Children At Risk relocation scheme from the Syrian region for 3,000 people, and committed to relocate more unaccompanied children from Europe at risk of exploitation and requiring family reunion.

It is worth pointing out, by comparison, how paltry the EU contribution has been, particularly in terms of resettlement. Last year, it agreed to relocate 160,000 people arriving in Greece and Italy to other sites across Europe, but only 660 people – 0.4 per cent – have actually been resettled.

Our priority should be to support refugees and displaced people in the region of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. If people don’t see a future in this region, they will continue to take the risks and costs of travelling to Europe.

Rather than people smugglers controlling the destination of vulnerable people, the international community should do so – and before they get to Europe. Apart from humanitarian aid and development, safe and legal routes for vulnerable refugees should be the main game in the region. The UK’s Children At Risk scheme should be joined by other countries rather than the current obstacle courses set by European Union countries, who mainly are in a race to the bottom to be as unattractive as possible. When Denmark with its proud heritage of providing refuge for Jews from the Nazis resorts to legislation which seizes assets from refugees to pay for their keep, something is going seriously wrong in Europe. Ensuring our response is compassionate requires us to take control. Control is not straightforward where people are fleeing poverty and drought as well as war and persecution. However at least in Europe fair and humane border controls are required, which do not on the one hand simply put up Macedonian fences and barbed wire, and on the other hand adopt Angela Merkel’s open door. That is why it is right that our Government has committed resources and expertise to improve the reception and processing of arrival centres. As much as the call for the UK to take the arbitrary number of 3,000 child refugees made the headlines and pulled the heart strings, it is the estimated 10,000 lone children going missing in Europe which compels practical and urgent action. So the £45 million and 75 UK additional experts who have been dispatched to Greece can make a real difference in making thousands of lone children safe.

The Government has put improving the life chances of the poorest and disadvantaged at the heart of its programme. A key test will be how we rise to the challenge of the refugee crisis full of compassion and control.
A lifeline for children

Tanya Steele on Britain’s duties to child refugees

Thousands of families sleeping in the open, in mud and snow, on the sides of roads. Tens of thousands in makeshift refugee camps. Women collapsing from exhaustion and desperation after days of walking, trying to reach safety. Children drowning in the Mediterranean, suffocating in lorries or trying to cross foreign countries, alone.

Despite seeing many of these things for myself in Greece this year, it remains hard to believe, and shameful, that they are happening in Europe.

The UK Government has shown great leadership in aid for Syria and the region, setting a pace that other countries must now match. In addition, the recent extremely welcome announcement by the Prime Minister on refugee children in Europe mirrors the lead the UK has taken in the Middle East on aid and refugee resettlement, with a lifeline to children who have reached Europe alone – echoing Britain’s proud history of offering sanctuary in times of crisis.

As we look to implement these new resettlement commitments, the Government’s pledge to give British resources and asylum expertise to support the overwhelmed systems in Europe will also be crucial.

In Greece, a country that is bearing the brunt of this crisis, the chaos is preventing children from even applying for asylum. The planned secondment of Home Office personnel to Greece will help to ensure that children’s asylum claims are heard. They will be working with the UN refugee agency UNHCR to establish new schemes to identify and assess children in Europe in whose best interests it would be to come to safety in the UK or be reunited with family elsewhere in Europe.

These assessments will look at a detailed set of criteria and evidence, including the child’s vulnerability; where family reunification may be possible in Europe or safe returning to their country of origin; what cultural, language or family links they may have in possible destination countries; and the child’s own views.

The Government also plans to fast track and strengthen asylum regulations, known as ‘Dublin III’ – giving hope to child refugees who have been stranded in the ‘The Jungle’ in Calais that they can be reunited with family members in the UK. Here in Britain, lone refugee children already here and those soon to arrive will benefit from a better system for relocation, as the Government offers more resource and better coordination to Local Authorities caring for vulnerable children.

These steps will lead to a system that benefits some of the most vulnerable children in the world – and guarantees that the UK is ready to support them.

But there is still more we can do to ensure these vulnerable children get the stability they need to feel that they have a real future here. In the UK, children are often granted Unaccompanied Children Leave until they are seventeen and a half years old, after which they need to re-apply for further leave to remain and face deportation to the countries from which they fled. The UK also does not afford child refugees the same rights to family reunion as adults, so if a lone child is in the UK and a family member is located further down the line, the child does not have the right to bring that family member over to live in safety with them.

Lone refugee children who are resettled in the UK must have permanent leave to remain and, if lost family members are located in Europe or loved ones later escape warzones, they should have the right to join the child here to build a new life together. Children who have experienced so much turmoil already should not have to face the risk of being uprooted or kept apart from loved ones in the future.

As a mother, a Brit and Chief Executive of a charity founded to respond to the refugee crisis in Europe caused by the First World War, I am proud our country is again stepping up with both an outstanding contribution in British aid in the Middle East and by offering a new life to children whose lives have been torn apart by war.
The refugee crisis is now rightly seen by many as a litmus test of Britain’s compassion. No one chooses to be a refugee. Refugees are people, like you and me forced to flee war and persecution. The response by our Government includes substantial funding to sustain the humanitarian response to the crises from which they flee, and of course welcoming refugees to the UK. But a third dimension has been neglected, with damaging consequences both for refugees and the UK. What happens to refugees once they arrive here?

The current system often fails both asylum applicants and the communities in which they settle. It’s in all our national interest to enable asylum applicants and refugees to rapidly build links with the communities around them, and contribute to our economy and our society.

Yet current policies actually make it harder for refugees to integrate and contribute. Refugees desperately want to learn English, but are frequently unable to access language classes. There’s no support for refugees to help them access the job market, or set up businesses. Asylum applicants are placed in temporary accommodation, often in areas of high social deprivation. There is little or no attempt to build relationships between them and existing communities.

For all our sakes, this must change. Refugee integration has slipped between the silos of ministerial responsibilities in the Home Office, Ministry of Communities and Local Government and elsewhere. The Prime Minister must put Whitehall to work, cooperating with the voluntary sector and businesses in three areas.

First, we must fast-track newly arrived refugees into high quality English classes. Rapid progress in English is of course essential for refugees to form relationships with existing communities, and to find work. But there are long waiting lists for English language classes across the country, due to steep cuts in Government funding. The result is that we grant refugees the right to remain in the UK, but don’t help them learn our language. It’s madness. Local volunteers and charities like Refugee Action can and do play a vital role in enabling people to practice English, with the support of local people. But this is no alternative to formal accredited tuition, particularly for written English. The Government must provide new funding, to enable refugees to integrate and contribute.

Second, the Government should set clear and ambitious goals for getting refugees into employment. The voluntary sector and businesses can play vital roles in this. There is considerable interest in supporting refugees to gain employment over the past six months. World Jewish Relief and a number of businesses are keen to develop programmes to help refugees into work, many inspired by the plight of Syrians fleeing to Britain. But to succeed, voluntary initiatives need to be part of a national strategy. In 2015, the UK gave refugee protection to 11,500 people. They want to work and pay taxes. Our Government must help them.

Third, the Government must actively support local authorities and the voluntary sector to build strong communities at local level. When the 2015 floods hit Britain, Syrian refugees were among those that stepped up to help. With the right support, refugees will be enthusiastic volunteers in their new communities, and members of sports clubs and community groups. But there is currently no role or funding for local authorities or the voluntary sector to promote dialogue and integration. It’s difficult to think of a worse way to foster the successful integration of refugees.

The EU referendum has taken the fog of misinformation and occasionally hysteria about refugees to a new level. It makes it all the more urgent that we support refugees in the UK to integrate and contribute to our society.

The Home Secretary announced at the Conservative Party conference in October that the Government would publish a new asylum strategy. Integration should be the primary focus of this. The current system neglects the talents of refugees, and in the long-term could weaken social cohesion. It is a lost opportunity for us all.
Integrated Britain?

Professor Anthony Heath on levels of integration in the UK and how they compare internationally

Almost every scholar, commentator and politician has their own definition of integration. My own approach is, first, to distinguish integration from assimilation. Assimilation I take to mean a process whereby migrants, and their descendants, increasingly come to be the same as other members of the society in their language, culture and attitudes, identities, and social relationships. This may take several generations to occur, but in the USA, for example, most scholars would agree that the descendants of the migrants from Italy, Poland, Ireland who migrated to America in the early years of the twentieth century have almost completely assimilated and are virtually indistinguishable from the descendants of the earlier British colonisers.

People who have only recently arrived from a non-English speaking origin are hardly likely to be able to participate fully in British public life if they are not fluent in English.

Second, however, I would also distinguish integration from separation. Separation is a situation where two communities lead parallel lives, attend separate schools and places of worship, go to different sports and social clubs, and work for different firms. Northern Ireland before the troubles came fairly close to separation with parallel Protestant and Catholic communities, as does Bosnia today with its parallel ethno-religious groups.

Between these opposites of assimilation and separation, there is a lot of scope for variation. There is no single form which integration can or should take. But I would see most forms of integration as being compatible with the maintenance (or evolution) of a group's cultural or religious practices – things which the classic British philosopher John Stuart Mill would have regarded as private matters of individual liberty, where individuals should be free to choose what they do or believe providing they do not harm others. And on the other hand I would see integration as requiring participation in a common public life, for example in work and in politics. Integration also involves speaking a common language, which is a pre-requisite for participation in a common public life.

So how well integrated are ethno-religious minorities in Britain? The first point to make is that – just as with my American example – integration is likely to improve across generations.

People who have only recently arrived from a non-English speaking origin are hardly likely to be able to participate fully in British public life if they are not fluent in English.

However, by the second generation (the British-born children of migrants) virtually all the members of all the main minorities (those with Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African, Black Caribbean or Chinese heritage) are fluent in English. So on this first criterion of integration, British minorities are almost 100% successful by the second generation.

A second aspect of integration is employment. This is a rather complex area, again with major differences between the migrants and their second-generation children. Broadly speaking migrants, from all ethnic backgrounds alike, tend to have higher unemployment rates, higher rates of inactivity, and to have lower-level jobs for which they are over-qualified, and lower pay than their white British peers. This varies somewhat between the different minorities, and some of the gaps between minorities and the majority can be explained by lack of fluent English. But, just as with fluency in English, the second generation is more integrated than their parents were. The major exception is with respect to unemployment. We still find significant ‘ethnic penalties’ in the second-generation – the children of migrants have significantly higher rates of unemployment than their white British peers of the same age and educational level, though this is less true of the Indian and Chinese communities.

On the other hand, among those who actually manage to get a job, second-generation occupational levels are quite similar to white British ones.

So employment is a much more mixed picture than language was. There is a great deal of generational change, but we cannot say that it is a picture of 100% success. The high unemployment rates – double those of the white British – suffered by black and Muslims youngsters, especially the boys – is a major weakness in Britain’s integration record.

Moving on to the political sphere, we once again find evidence of major change across the generations. The first generation are less likely to be registered to vote than are the white British, and many of course will not even be eligible to register. Among the second generation, eligibility is somewhat higher, and registration rates are slightly improved, but there is still a big gap between minorities and the majority in rates of registration.

Interestingly, among people who are registered to vote, actual rates of turnout are not especially different between minorities and the majority.

Registration is the barrier when it comes to political life, just as unemployment was the barrier in
The high unemployment rates – double those of the white British – suffered by black and Muslims youngsters, especially the boys – is a major weakness in Britain’s integration record.

How does Britain’s record compare with other countries? In 2015 the OECD produced a report Indicators of Immigrant Integration. The report covers a wide variety of outcomes, but let me just summarize a few central ones, focussing on the performance of young people in the second generation.

- **Literacy (a good measure of fluency in the destination country language):** Britain is one of the best performers, well above the OECD and EU averages.

- **Unemployment:** Britain has one of the bigger gaps between minority and majority unemployment rates for young people (15-34 years old). It is below both the OECD and EU averages, roughly as bad as France and Germany and well below Australia, Canada and the USA.

- **Election turnout (self-reported):** Britain is one of the best performers, with the second generation reporting even higher turnout than their white British peers. In contrast, minority turnout in Germany is 20 points below that of their German peers.

The history of Muslim integration in the UK

Helen Carr on how history must inform current integration debates

HELEN CARR is an Associate Fellow at Bright Blue

Last summer, in a speech at Ninestiles School in Birmingham about British minority communities, David Cameron announced that he had asked a Government official, Louise Casey, to lead a review of “how to boost opportunity and integration in these communities and bring Britain together as one nation”. In instigating such a review, the Prime Minister is one in a long line of those seeking solutions to the complex problems faced by Britain as a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-faith society.

Yet in attempting to show empathy, Cameron made an important, though not uncommon, mistake. He expressed understanding of how difficult it can be “being young and Muslim, or young and Sikh, or young and black in our country”.

In doing so, he failed to distinguish the difficulties faced by racial and ethnic minorities with those faced by religious minorities. Although these difficulties are at times very similar, and at times overlap, they are also distinct and should be treated as such.

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Cameron’s comments are symbolic of a broader historical tendency to allow a race relations framework to guide interaction with minority groups, at the expense of hearing or addressing the needs of religious minorities. While Muslims are largely recognised as a religious minority in the media and by the Government, this has not always been the case. Historically, the needs of newly-arrived religious minorities, including Muslims, were not initially regarded as separate from the broader needs of Britain’s immigrant, ‘black’, or ethnic minority population.

In contemporary Britain, Muslims are being urged to integrate, and face accusations that they are not doing so, and choose to remain separate from the non-Muslim population. But such exhortations are rarely accompanied by questions about the past: have Muslims
attempted to integrate historically? Have they been successful? If so, why and if not, why not?

An understanding of the past is crucial to the success of contemporary relations. It is with this in mind that I am authoring a report for Bright Blue on the history of integration of Muslims in Britain, exploring when and where Muslims have attempted to integrate, and how those attempts have been received.

The publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses has been seen as a watershed moment in the development of Britain’s Muslim community. In 2002, Phillip Lewis wrote that, as a result of the Rushdie Affair, “from being culturally and politically invisible, Muslims were suddenly projected as a fifth column, subversive of western freedoms: a Trojan horse in the heart of Europe with a deadly cargo of ‘fundamentalist’ religiosity”.

The idea of the invisibility of Muslims is based on the fact that the origins of much of Britain’s sizeable Muslim community lie in the mass migration of young workers to Britain following the end of empire and the 1948 Nationality Act. When Muslims arrived from the Indian subcontinent, they arrived not as Muslims, but as economic migrants along with those from the West Indies and other places. These immigrants were defined according to their race, colour, nationality or ethnicity, with a tendency to group all non-white immigrants together as ‘black’. This meant that the new arrivals, and their needs and problems, were understood from the point of view of race relations. Where religious needs were expressed at all, they were placed in the category of race relations.

The dominance of the race relations framework has meant that, whilst discussions of integration have been taking place for half a century or more, they have been discussions of racial, or ethnic integration. Whilst the Rushdie Affair did bring Muslims to a certain prominence, and there is now a deeper understanding in general of the cultures and religions of Britain’s ethnic minority communities, Cameron’s speech underlines the ongoing tendency to run together questions of ethnic and religious integration.

At the heart of Cameron’s message was that there is a place for these diverse minority groups in Britain, and that if they make the effort to take that place and to integrate, Government will support them. This is an endeavour that must be informed by historical attempts at integration, both the successes and failures.
Testing times for citizenship

Professor Thom Brooks on why the citizenship test is not fit for purpose

The ‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test is now a central part of the British immigration system. Anyone wanting permanent residency or naturalisation is normally required to pass the test. Tens of thousands take it each year and over two million tests have been sat since its launch in 2005.

The test format is straightforward. There are 24 multiple questions and 18 or more must be answered correctly to pass. But the test’s origins are more difficult to pin down. Following the Oldham riots and 9/11 in 2001, the then Labour Government under Tony Blair was committed to a radical plan for reforming immigration. The citizenship test was a part of these reforms.

The test’s purpose was to provide evidence that migrants have sufficient knowledge about life in the UK and British values – and thus provide evidence of integration. However, this has not gone to plan.

The first version of the test was launched in 2005 and a second edition published in 2007. Both were notable by their errors. They included mistakes like getting wrong the number of MPs in Parliament. When I sat the test in 2009, it was possible to sit a test where the correct answers were all factually false. The citizenship tests demanded little knowledge of British history and culture. I campaigned for a change in 2011 and welcomed the Coalition Government’s commitment to revising the test because it addressed this issue.

However, the pendulum has swung too far in this new direction. The citizenship test has gone from a test of practical trivia to the more purely trivial. The test handbook has grown to 180 pages crammed with about 3,000 facts and over 250 dates. Gone is information about contacting emergency services, reporting a crime or registering with a GP. In its place, we learn the approximate age of Big Ben’s clock and the height of the London Eye. Telephone numbers like 999 are out, but the front desk of the Scottish Parliament is included to ‘book tickets or arrange tours’. Or that Sake Dean Mahomet came to Britain from Bengal in 1782 to set up Britain’s first curry house in 1810 – the Hindoostane Coffee House – on George Street, London. Few, if any, British citizens know these facts – which are fit only for a bad pub quiz – nor should any be expected to.

The effect of making many new citizens pass knowledge tests that no born British citizen could runs the serious risk of not bringing future British citizens together, but helping push them apart.

This is not an argument for making the test less difficult or important. I believe it should continue to play a role in immigration policy. But we need to consider whether the current test does more harm than good – and the measures we should adopt to ensure it fulfils its original purpose. Becoming British is an important milestone and we honour that by treating the test and our naturalisation policies with the respect they deserve. Doing nothing about the test is not an option we should tolerate any longer.
Ensuring Britain really has got talent

Zenia Chopra recommends steps to help attract skilled migrants to the UK

If you’re an employee, you are part of your employer’s most important asset. After all, the average business spends 75% of its revenues on payroll. But you’re not as loyal as your antecedents. Human capital is becoming as mobile as financial capital, with people in every walk of life – whether scientists, engineers, sport stars and artists – increasingly happy to up sticks and move to another country. Migration flows are increasingly being driven by this super-mobility of labour.

Despite the competitive pressures for talent, most commentators think more liberal immigration reform in the UK is unlikely. And given the recent announcement that the Tier two (General) salary thresholds for experienced workers will be increasing from £20,800 to £25,000 in autumn of this year, and £30,000 in April 2017, together with the introduction of a £1,000 skills levy, the pessimism seems well placed.

However, the time will come when the UK is forced to compete to attract the talent it needs to succeed. Behind closed doors, politicians and civil servants are aware that we need to remain attractive to skilled migrants – so here are a few reforms that would help.

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However, the time will come when the UK is forced to compete to attract the talent it needs to succeed. Behind closed doors, politicians and civil servants are aware that we need to remain attractive to skilled migrants – so here are a few reforms that would help.

In committing itself to a net migration target, the Conservative Government has painted itself into a corner. For as long as we are in the EU with free movement of people and our economy is doing well, there will be demand from Europeans to move to the UK. Given that the target looks set to stay, the Government should take international students out of the equation. Ipsos Mori’s survey of public attitudes to immigration shows that over half the British public are happy with the current number of international students or would be happy with more; in contrast, less than a third want to see fewer international students.

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The Government should bring back the Post Study Work visa. Despite our historic, world-class universities, the fact that graduates can only stay four months upon completion of their course (rather than the previous two years) is making the UK an increasingly unattractive place to study. If two years is too long for political sensibilities, one year would be a reasonable compromise. Just look at Canada and Australia who are welcoming students with open arms. If this disparity of attractiveness continues, expect to see British universities steadily slip down the rankings as they’re drained of their best brains.

The Exceptional Talent visa schemes are a useful policy for getting top talent into the UK. Schemes run by Arts Council England, the British Academy, the Royal Academy of Engineering, the Royal Society and Tech City UK (Tech Nation) are bringing in key talent. However, awareness about these schemes remains too limited and some of these organisations are surprisingly conservative when it comes to endorsing international talent. The Government should encourage endorsing bodies to frame the exceptional talent routes as competitions – as has been done to good effect with the Sirius scheme run by UKTI for international entrepreneurs – to garner more interest, with the FCO, UKTI and our embassies around the world helping to spread the word.

Access Tier 5, the Tier 5 Government Authorised Exchange (GAE) scheme that I set up and run for AIESEC UK, has proved very successful for helping recent international graduates come to the UK for a year’s work experience. But despite the broad success of the Tier 5 GAE route, it is still not known or well understood by many international students, HR managers and employers. As well as raising the profile of this route,
the Government should open it up for 2 years without the need for individuals to leave the UK and allow them to switch onto Tier 2 easily. (Currently migrants have to leave the UK, which is an unnecessary additional bureaucratic hurdle.) If the Post Study Work visa isn’t brought back, this could ensure that the door is ajar for international students who wish to remain in the UK.

Finally, the Government needs to plug the growing skills gap for start-ups. Following the success of Mark Zuckerberg and other tech billionaires, many of the best and brightest around the world increasingly aspire to change the world through entrepreneurship. However, many start-up entrepreneurs don’t have the time or money to go through the Tier 2 sponsor licence process and no Tier 5 GAE scheme is devoted specifically to helping start-ups. Whether the solution is a new visa route, a simplified Tier 2 route or a specific Tier 5 scheme for start-ups (or all three), something should be done to help Britain’s entrepreneurs get the talent they need to scale up their businesses. It’s absurd that while other nations are implementing strategies to attract skilled workers we are putting a levy on them coming to the UK. The virtues of highly skilled immigration are uncontested by economists, and deep down most politicians know that in an increasingly competitive global economy, highly skilled migration isn’t just the icing on the cake of a successful, dynamic country: it’s a huge slice. It’s time for the Government to ditch its excessively nativist policies in favour of policies that will ensure Britain has the skills to thrive.

Nick Hillman examines the contribution of foreign students to the UK and our immigration system

Nick Hillman is the Director of the Higher Education Policy Institute

It is a given on the centre right that the Government is in the wrong place on migration policy, particularly with regard to international students. Setting a tough numerical target for net inward migration that includes international students is unwise for three reasons.

Foreign students are a clear benefit because they come here, spend lots of money and then (usually) go home again. Moreover, the typical lifestyle of an international student means they do not clog up our roads, fight for good school places or fill up our hospital beds. First, it forces Ministers to seek reductions in the number of international students, thereby banning ourselves from exporting one of our greatest service sectors. Secondly, it chases a target no one knows how to hit, thereby reducing trust in politicians. Thirdly, it sends a signal to the rest of the world that we want our leading educational institutions to be a little less open than they have been in the past. That is all well understood. The question is what to do about it. Here is a three-stage plan.

First, if Home Office Ministers will not listen to the higher education sector, then we need to use the Home Office’s own procedures for changing the terms of the debate. There is an independent group above party politics that reports to the Home Office called the Migration Advisory Committee. Its role is to answer knotty migration-related questions with evidence. The one really significant question they have never been posed is whether international students are a cost or a benefit to the UK. Those of us working in education policy think foreign students are a clear benefit because they come here, spend lots of money and then (usually) go home again. Moreover, the typical lifestyle of an international student means they do not clog up our roads, fight for good school places or fill up our hospital beds. But the Home Office like to imply they are a cost. So let us farm the question out to the Migration Advisory Committee who can deliver an evidence-based verdict.

Second, we need to ensure policymakers understand why the issue matters as much as it does. This needs to go way beyond money. Last year, I sought to put my mind into the head of the most right-wing Conservative backbencher and then to ask myself the following question: is there anything that would persuade me more international students are a good thing? My conclusion was that I might accept the arguments in favour of international students if I thought my own son or daughter would benefit and if I thought the UK’s power around the world increased as a result. So let us farm the question out to the Migration Advisory Committee who can deliver an evidence-based verdict.

My conclusion was that I might accept the arguments in favour of international students if I thought my own son or daughter would benefit and if I thought the UK’s power around the world increased as a result. So, in conjunction with the Higher Education Academy, we conducted a survey among students to see if they thought their education benefited from diversity among the student body. The answer was
Meeting targets
It is very difficult for the Government to meet its net migration target, explains Madeleine Sumption

Over the past few years, the scale of migration has become increasingly important in the UK’s public debate, fuelled in part by the failure of the migration figures to cooperate with the ‘tens of thousands’ net migration target.

There are many technical questions about how we measure migration and how migration targets can be constructed. These include whether students could be removed from the target (something that, from a technical perspective, is actually more difficult than it sounds), and whether the data sources that are used to measure migration are capturing it accurately.

However, beyond these technical questions there are some broader conceptual ones. In particular, two observations are worth considering in any effort to target reductions in migration.

The first is that the relationship between migration policy and the number of people who migrate is not as straightforward as one might think. Policy clearly plays a crucial role in shaping the number of people who qualify to come to the country or to settle here. However, the same policy does not always lead to the same level of migration over time.

For example, citizens of the long standing ‘EU-14’ member states like France and Spain have had access to the UK labour market under EU rules for decades. But net migration of EU-14 citizens averaged less than 15,000 from 1997-2003 compared to around 80,000 in 2015. There has been essentially no change in policy but the numbers have greatly increased.

This is not just a feature of the EU. The numbers of non-EU migrants have fluctuated over time and respond not just to policy but also to factors like the strength of the labour market (in the case of workers) or exchange rates (in the case of students deciding where they can afford to study).

As an aside: fluctuations such as these are not the only reason the ‘tens of thousands’ target was not met, although they contributed. A more basic reason was that the policies introduced to reduce migration, despite being some of the strictest ones in the developed world—for example in the case of family migration—were not restrictive enough to make the numbers in each migration category add to less than 100,000. The plan was not equal to the sum of its parts.

For a given set of rules, the number of people taking up the opportunity to migrate will not be constant. This does not imply a lack of ‘control’ so much as the lack of a crystal ball

The second observation is that the Government cannot specify both the criteria and the number of people who will qualify under those criteria. ‘Criteria’ in this context may include policies such as “a non-EU citizen must be in a job paying at least £30,000 to qualify for a work visa” or “UK residents can only bring their spouses to the UK if they earn at least £18,600 per year”—to take some recent examples.
criteria are at the core of immigration policy because they represent the Government’s judgement about what kind of migration should and should not be allowed. Where there are disagreements between parties or politicians on migration policy, they will usually revolve around the criteria—whether there are people who should be allowed to come to the UK who do not qualify, or vice versa.

If policy focuses on numbers rather than criteria, then the criteria will have to be adjusted over time to counteract changes in the underlying numbers of people who want to migrate. This can lead to a situation in which the Government does not have full control the criteria themselves. There may therefore be a trade-off between being able to specify the criteria and being able to specify the numbers.

A good example of this dynamic in practice was the system for prioritising Tier 2 worker applications in the event that applications exceeded the 20,700 cap introduced in the last parliament. This system was designed to automatically change the criteria—particularly the pay required for most employer-sponsored non-EU workers—in order to keep numbers at or below a given level. When the cap was first met in June 2015 and the prioritisation mechanism kicked in, the required pay unexpectedly (and, it turned out, temporarily) increased to £46,000. This quickly prompted a review of salary criteria. The Migration Advisory Committee was consulted and ultimately recommended that a threshold of £30,000 (with various trimmings, such as exemptions for some workers and a new employer fee to raise the costs of employing non-EU workers) would make more economic sense.

There is no right answer to how much migration there should be, just as there are legitimate arguments to be made in favour of or against particular criteria. But the inescapable reality is that level of migration cannot be determined independently of the bigger questions about what kind of immigration system we want.

Immigration detention: why it’s time for a time limit

The UK’s detention system needs serious reform, argues Labour MP Paul Blomfield

“‘It’s worse than prison’ was the shocking description of immigration detention by someone who had experienced it. Why? Because “in prison, you count your days down, but in detention you count your days up” we were told on the cross-party inquiry into immigration detention, of which I was vice-chair last year and whose members included a Conservative former Cabinet Minister. In the UK, unusually, we detain people for immigration purposes indefinitely. It’s not unending detention, but detainees do not know when they will be released – and some are held for years.

Immigration detention has been used by successive Governments for a number of reasons, including to establish identity, because a person might breach the conditions attached to his/her admission and to effect removal. Last year 32,446 people entered immigration detention in the UK – up by 7% on the previous year. Every now and then there is a fresh news report about poor treatment of individuals in the detention estate, but beyond that, we hear relatively little about what goes on. Our cross-party inquiry into immigration detention set about to cast some light on the issue.

Home Office guidance states that detention must be used sparingly and for the shortest possible period. But what became clear during the course of the inquiry is that the standard working practices and the enforcement–focused culture of the Home Office are resulting in this guidance being ineffective.

More striking still is the evidence that the longer an individual is detained, the less likely it is that that person’s detention will end with their removal. Indeed, we came across numerous examples of alternatives to immigration detention being used to better effect in other countries. These alternatives achieve high levels of compliance with the immigration system through a more intensive, front-loaded casework system, a focus on the dignity of the applicant and opportunities to connect in the community in normal human ways, making absconding unlikely and compliance more usual. They are also considerably cheaper.

So our headline recommendation – that there should be a 28 day time limit on immigration detention – is actually no more than the natural conclusion drawn from our other observations about the need for culture change in the Home Office. Namely the need to move from relying only on enforcement to achieve results, to investing in engagement. In such a system, costly detention really would be used for the shortest possible time. Our recommendation...
The 'sponsor' (the partner settled in the UK) to show that he or she had had a gross annual income of at least £18,600 over the six months prior to the partner who wishes to join the family lodging an application for a visa.

In the event that the family included children who were not British or EU nationals then the earning required rose by £3,800 if one child was involved and £2,400 for each additional child. For a couple with two children the earnings needed would therefore be £24,800. These earnings thresholds present a real challenge for many and there seems to be little regard for the fact that life on relatively low income levels is quite common in the country today.

The impact of the new rules, brought into effect in July 2012, has been pronounced. In the final year before the earnings requirement was ramped up to the higher level some 31,508 visas were issued to non-UK and non-EU nationals: in the first 12 months after this fell to 24,641 – a drop of nearly 7,000.

Their bad luck maybe, but there is no getting away from the intense sense of injustice which many of the refused feel about the loss of the opportunity of enjoy family life in the land of their citizenship. The support group for victims of the measure, Britcits, reports on the anguish of people who, amongst other vocations, have served their country in the armed forces and whose modestly-remunerated jobs when they return back home have been judged insufficient to permit life with a non-British, non-EU partner.

Back in March, the Britcits family members made to get their case before the Supreme Court for three days of hearings. The Home Office argued that the measure was critical for protecting the public from a grave mischief. A decision is awaited from the Court which might yet cause Mrs May to think again about her commitment to a requirement of the immigration rules which has split families, enforced long-term welfare benefit dependency on people who find themselves as sole carers, and the emergence of a group of forlorn youngsters whose night-time story is read to them via Skype by a parent who is trapped on another continent.
Yasmin Alibhai-Brown is the only person I know who lists the people she has offended on her website. It’s worth reproducing that list here, to give an idea of how difficult it is to put her in any one box: Prince Charles, Cherie Blair, Bruce Anderson, Melanie Phillips, Boris Johnson, Rod Liddle, David Blunkett and his erstwhile lover Kimberley Quinn, Keith Vaz, The Board of Jewish Deputies, The Muslim Council of Britain, Ken Livingstone, Diane Abbott and The National Black Alliance. As a writer and commentator, she has an extraordinary ability to question the status quo with a fresh, independent viewpoint combined with an insatiable curiosity and an impeccable command of her facts. I agree with three quarters of what she says (I was particularly influenced by her recent polemical essay for Biteback’s Provocations series, Refusing the Veil) so was delighted to hear that she would be on a panel at a literary salon which I chaired recently, giving me the perfect excuse to read her latest book, *Exotic England: the Making of a Curious Nation*.

*Exotic England* seeks to identify the essence of Englishness (as opposed to Britishness), but unlike other works on the subject such as those by Kate Fox and Jeremy Paxman, it concentrates specifically (and, it argues, unavoidably) on the English people’s relationship with the wider world, especially with Asia: “You can’t take England out of the Orient nor the Orient out of England” (p146). The book traces England’s history with the rest of the world through its obsession with exploration and trade for the best part of the last thousand years, surmising that as a result of all this activity, “England can never become parochial and insular” (p31). The book asks to what extent the Reformation meant that England had to seek a new identity, taking us not only through the history of English trade and colonisation, but also offering a comprehensive tour of English architecture, art, theatre and selected individuals throughout history, demonstrating their interdependency on non-European cultures. The book’s conclusion is that a “more truthful narrative (is) needed” (p127), that England has an opportunity to “pick up after decolonisation, shake off regret, regroup and create a new powerbase” (p122).

What struck me most on reading *Exotic England* during the EU referendum campaign was the picture it paints of an outward looking nation, inextricably bound up with cultures outside of Europe: “Unlike anywhere else in Britain and the continent, human bonds and intimacy between the races have been woven into the fabric of English society” (p117). I have no idea where Alibhai-Brown stands on the EU question – most likely her views are far too nuanced to place her firmly in one camp or the other – but *Exotic England* makes a very good case for the forward looking, globalised view of Brexit, arguing that “little England” is an impossibility, instead referring specifically to “big England” (p275). Whilst I feel that Alibhai-Brown’s view of colonialism sometimes makes the mistake of imposing a twenty first century world view on very different times (she is up front about being a “ferocious anti-colonialist” (p8) early on in the book), *Exotic England* is a critically important addition to the canon of books seeking to pinpoint English identity, offering an alternative narrative which in many ways is more generous to its subjects than more conventional accounts. Indeed, it is a relentlessly positive book: a celebration of Englishness which, whilst bearing in mind lessons from the past, offers an optimistic view of the nation’s future.

The arts argument: Remain or Leave?

The Case for Remain

ZAKIY MANJI IS THE ADVOCATE COORDINATOR FOR CONSERVATIVES IN

Much has been made of the economic and immigration arguments surrounding the European Union, but what of the contribution that our membership of this exclusive club has been, and continues to be, to our culture, and indeed, culture as a whole.

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Our ‘small island nation’ fosters not only home-grown talent, but is also the destination of choice for those all over to come and flourish. The ability for our fellow Europeans to come and benefit from the highest quality teaching and learning facilities is unrivalled, and were we to be forced into revoking this freedom of movement, things would drastically change – musicians would suddenly be unable to easily country-hop as they currently do for concerts, actors and crews filming on location would be limited with where they could go (and at a much greater cost), and there would no longer be chefs-a-plenty for truly authentic cuisine. A powerful picture from the Guildhall School of Music showed the orchestra fully populated whilst Britain remains in the EU, and a second photo with around 40% missing as a result of Brexit. As it currently stands, we are able to encourage the best talent to come here from the finest conservatoires and restaurants, to earn very competitive salaries, join world class organisations, and in some cases, enjoy tax relief – since April of this year, orchestras have benefited from such tax relief measures.

The Single Market is a term that has been used often in this debate, but in cultural terms, it is the Digital Single Market that has opened up the breadth of content available across the EU, via services such as Netflix and Spotify. Through this, we are a comparable and competitive marketplace to the USA where many of the best films and programming originate, we are on par at the negotiating table, and also in the minds of studio and network bosses (TV series and film release dates used to be a year later for us, but this has been massively reduced). The rise of the cheap flights into Europe, cross-border travel is not a problem, and allows us to really experience their culture ourselves – the number of Brits living abroad is testament to this.

Finally, the single market allows London to be one of the preeminent contemporary art markets in the world – the ability of many major league London art galleries to import and sell work by European artists easily has surely greatly aided and helped foster art movements such as the ‘Cluj school’ of Romanian painters, for example, and bring their work to a British and a global audience.

At a dinner party I attended the weekend just gone, the intensity of the conversation rose as the discussion arrived at the topic of the EU Referendum. However, unlike the traditional ‘Brexit’ chatter that echoes around dining tables up and down the country, there was little mention of the renegotiation, and a blessed silence on the subject of a certain UKIP politician: instead, the focus was on culture, and the cultural contributions of different EU countries to the global mix. Yes, France has set the standard for culinary delights; Italy has defined the cut of my suit and my shoes; and Germany has populated the roads from Devon to Dubrovnik, via Düsseldorf and Dunkirk – but, the question must be asked, what has this small island nation that is the United Kingdom really added? Music, art, literature, theatre, and more – Tallis or Tom Jones, Hogarth or Hirst, Rudyard and Rowling, Shakespeare and Pinter – the list goes on. In culture, as in so many other fields, Britain is a leading light, and it is imperative that they not be extinguished: a veritable leap into the dark...

The Case for Leave

GUY OLLIFF-COOPER IS FORMER RESEARCHER TO ANDREW GRIFFITHS MP, IS ABOUT TO EMBARK ON A PUPILLAGE AT 4 STONE BUILDING

I should probably point out from the outset that I am not at all qualified to write this article. I gave up the piano when I was eight years old, my drawings look like stick men, I forgot my lines in every play I ever featured, and my writing (as you’re about to discover) is distinctly mediocre.

That said even I, philistine though I may be, can see that much of what is being said about Brexit and the arts is pure tosh (as Boris Johnson would say). We are told without EU funding British cultural industries would simply shrivel up and die, ignoring the fact that Britain contributes twice as much to Creative Europe as it receives, meaning that a post-Brexit Government could

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Some of my fellow Brexiteers believe that our departure from the EU will lead to a dramatic rejuvenation of British culture.

We are also warned that without free movement Britain would become inaccessible to European talent. This is just silly. We already allow non-EU citizens from ‘western’ countries to come to the UK for up to six months without a visa, and absolutely no one is suggesting that Britain uses its newly won border control to prevent European musicians and artists from expressing their creativity on our shores. It’s not as if the wages of British artists are being driven down by a sudden influx of German abstract expressionists.

Recently the British public was presented with an open letter signed by over 250 ‘cultural stars’, which farcically claimed that only by being part of an international super-state such as the EU is it possible to “collaborate across borders”. Presumably, this explains why no British actor has ever appeared in a Hollywood movie. The same letter claimed that leaving the EU would make Britons “less imaginative”, as if our ability to come up with new ideas is magically generated by a clause in the Lisbon Treaty.

Some of my fellow Brexiteers believe that our departure from the EU will lead to a dramatic rejuvenation of British culture. They argue that Britain’s natural pioneering spirit has been undermined by the collective collapse in self-confidence caused by the realisation that we are becoming just one small province within a United States of Europe. Only by voting to leave on 23rd June can we extricate ourselves from this psychological straight jacket, and rediscover the pride and the patriotism that once inspired the likes of Constable, Kipling, Britten, and Vaughan Williams.

Seems plausible, but being utterly devoid of artistic talent I don’t really know. One thing I do know however is that the EU has nothing to do with producing creative genius. Inspiration comes in many forms, but never in the form of a Directive. How many symphonies have been dedicated to the EU? How many paintings, plays, or novels? Whatever it is that generates cultural output it is certainly beyond the understanding of the likes of Jean-Claude Juncker.

Insofar as a nation’s culture is determined by the character of its people then I suppose Brexit could have an effect. Ultimately, the debate about Brexit and the arts matters less when compared to the key questions of sovereignty and economic prosperity. I am sure that actors and artists care just as much as anyone else about the right to elect and unelect their lawmakers. But I am sure that the creative industries have just as much to gain as any other exporter from the opening up of Britain’s economy to fast-growing international markets.
All at sea is a tremendous achievement, and one that does much to comment on the fragility and importance of human relationships.

The idyllic surroundings and unassuming luxury of the beach resort belie a deepening sense of dread in the first few pages, which makes the exact moment of tragedy utterly horrific for the reader: how could something so devastating occur in a seemingly perfect paradise? Aitkenhead’s own panic, initial refusal to accept Tony’s death, then crushing realisation of the horror and immediacy of it, creates a powerful and emotionally charged first chapter.

The narrative then retreats to how Tony and Aitkenhead first met. Aitkenhead recounts her care-free middle-class upbringing with plenty of introspection. She styles herself ‘well-spoken’, but declares how her membership of a ‘peculiarly niche substratum of the British class system’, which considered family titles like ‘mother’ and ‘father’ unnecessary and impersonal, led to her to precocious activities like tipping her remembrance poppy a crudely pacificist white. As in the opening chapter, Aitkenhead here neatly foreshadows her remembrance poppy a crudely pacificist white. As in the opening chapter, Aitkenhead here neatly foreshadows the mysterious, and only scratch the surface of, a fascinating and troubling book. Overall, All at Sea is a tremendous achievement, and one that does much to comment on the fragility and importance of human relationships.

How could something so devastating occur in a seemingly perfect paradise?

These criticisms, however, are insignificant, and only scratch the surface of a fascinating and troubling book. Overall, All at Sea is a tremendous achievement, and one that does much to comment on the fragility and importance of human relationships.

All at sea, Decca Aitkenhead; Fourth Estate; 240pp; £16.99

>> because I don’t want to forget – before introducing us to the hauntingly beautiful setting of Calabash beach, where Tony drowned after rescuing one of his sons from the waves.

Acquaintance of the couple from further down their street. Once Tony and Aitkenhead are an item, class takes centre stage – the predictable incredulity and disapproval of both partners’ friends and families is detailed, along with amusing vignettes of their blossoming yet bizarre romance. Aitkenhead is loathe to move with Tony to Canary Wharf, which she castigates as ‘a child’s drawing of capitalist alienation…my idea of perfect hell’, whilst Tony struggles to cope in the miasma of small-talk and respectability in which Aitkenhead and her circle thrive. The stark contrast between the couple generates a great deal of reflection on Aitkenhead’s part; Tony’s wildly different world-view and behaviour, characterised by shady dealings, a nocturnal lifestyle and regular drug use, leaves the author questioning the very tenets of her own existence.

She recounts with excruciating embarrassment how a drunken evening before she left Jamaica led her to asking for money from some celebrity friends who had sent their condolences (thankfully, she writes, she received no response). Aitkenhead’s burgeoning role as a single mother engenders similarly unfortunate behaviour, such as quickly dispensing of a pair of incontinent cats that she had managed to acquire from a reluctant owner by exploiting her devastating circumstances. The final section of the book, where Aitkenhead bravely returns to Calabash beach with her children, is prefaced by a heart-breaking and revealing account of the death from cancer of her mother, when Aitkenhead was only nine. You are left marvelling at the immeasurable courage and depth of feeling that Aitkenhead must have drawn upon to be able to recount such personal catastrophes with the poise and interest that she has.

Given the heart-rendering nature of All at Sea, it is difficult to find fault with the book. Structurally, Aitkenhead’s decision to begin the story with Tony’s death inevitably draws an unshakeable pallor over the narrative that may put off some readers, though it is hard to see how the tenor of the work could be anything but mournful. Some of the anecdotes seem a little cosy and at times mischievous – Aitkenhead references a karaoke evening that she and Tony enjoyed with a ‘chinless middle-aged Tory MP who, at the time of writing, is now the Secretary of State for Culture’. We can only wonder whether Aitkenhead was aware of the salacious scandal that would soon engulf that particular individual when she included this detail.
Charmed Life: The Phenomenal World of Philip Sassoon
By Damian Collins

Philip Sassoon died just three months before the Second World War, which may be the main reason why we are not more familiar with this pivotal 20th century figure. Author Damian Collins succeeds skilfully in righting this historical oversight in Charmed Life. Collins is the current Conservative MP for Folkestone and Hythe, which was Philip Sassoon’s seat from 1912 until his untimely death in 1939. Collins told me at the recent book launch that residents who lived at that time still clearly remember Philip Sassoon. And Port Lympne, Sassoon’s extravagant mansion near Folkestone, is today beautifully restored.

Sassoon was one of the early few proponents of British rearmament, based on first-hand knowledge of what was going on in Germany at the time.

Sassoon was an expert networker and perhaps even discovered the modern concept of a conference, where attendees meet to discuss business but also then relax with drink, food and conversation. While those who are good at networking have always brought together people with common interests, such as the Bloomsbury group of writers and artists, the sheer sweep of Sassoon’s network may never be repeated. And his impact on the policymakers of the day was very clear. Sassoon hosted four conferences at Port Lympne, following the First World War, where the British and French leaders would meet to discuss German war reparations.

But by then it was too late. Importantly, Sassoon saw how crucial air transportation would be for what was then Britain’s extensive Empire. He pushed for development of Britain’s aviation industry as well as the still very young Royal Air Force. Along with Churchill, he also saw the rate at which Hitler’s Germany was building military aircraft. Sassoon was one of the early few proponents of British rearmament, based on first-hand knowledge of what was going on in Germany at the time. Sassoon would not live to see the RAF’s victory in the Battle of Britain in 1940, though his efforts were essential in securing it.

Sassoon lived a fast paced life... As Deedes put it, “This was his style of life, and it did him no good at all.”

Sassoon lived a fast paced life. Bill Deedes, a close friend and parliamentary correspondent with the Daily Telegraph, recalls a day he spent with Sassoon. First, the pair enjoyed a round of golf, accompanied by four caddies, that was finished in two hours. Then driven to the beach in one of Sassoon’s cars for a swim and from there on to lunch at Port Lympne, Sassoon’s Kent estate. Tennis after lunch then a “quick flip” from Lympne aerodrome, where Sassoon kept one of his aeroplanes (though Deedes declined the “flip”). As Deedes put it, “This was his style of life, and it did him no good at all.”

Indeed, by ignoring his doctor’s advice for rest, and instead going back to work too soon, Philip Sassoon succumbed to a very serious throat infection which had spread to his lungs. He was just 50 years old. Damian Collins entertainingly presents a Philip Sassoon as an aesthete and socialite but also a serious and effective politician of his day.