Murdo Fraser MSP: Our still United Kingdom – A ‘quasi-federal’ future?

One of the consequences of Brexit has been to crowd out from political discourse much discussion of further UK constitutional reform, unless we include renewed agitation from Scottish Nationalists for a second independence referendum. The irony is that the UK constitution, unwritten as it may be, will have to adapt to take account of post-Brexit arrangements. Our departure from the EU, and the disapplication of EU Law and its replacement with the new concept of ‘EU Retained Law’, as set out in the EU Withdrawal Act 2018, will require new processes, and structures, to be created within the United Kingdom. And yet, very little thinking has been done about what this all means for the British constitution, and specifically for relationships between the four nations that make up our Union.

We will face these challenges sooner than we think. And with nationalists in different parts of the United Kingdom seeking to use Brexit uncertainty for their own political ends, it is important that unionists have a coherent response. So it is time to reform our government structures to create a ‘quasi-federal’ United Kingdom. A failure to change may make the pressures pushing our four nations apart irresistible.

Brexit and the UK Constitution

Our current constitutional arrangements in the UK were simply not designed to deal with a situation whereby we would vote to leave the EU. The devolution settlement for Scotland and Wales is based upon the assumption that the UK will be part of the EU, and devolved legislatures are therefore specifically subject to EU Law. The EU Withdrawal Act 2018 replaces EU Law with ‘Retained EU Law’, which will continue to have an overriding impact on devolved law-making.

What has become clear is that there are areas of responsibility previously exercised at an EU level, for example on agriculture or the environment, which in terms of the devolution settlement would normally fall to the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly to be exercised. However, there is a clear shared interest in certain decisions in these areas being taken in future on a common UK-wide basis. So, for example, whilst rules around food labelling might technically fall within a devolved competence, it is in the interests of Scottish and Welsh farmers to retain common rules across the United Kingdom to retain the integrity of the UK internal market.

This has led to a shared desire amongst the UK Government and the devolved administrations to establish ‘Common Frameworks’ which will set out the rules which will apply in future to all parts of the UK. But how will these Common Frameworks be agreed, and how will they operate in practice, and be enforced?

There are some 24 areas which have been identified between the UK and Scottish governments where Legislative Common Frameworks will need to apply.[i] But we are as yet unclear how agreement will be reached, in the event of a dispute between the Scottish and UK Governments, or indeed the administrations of Wales or Northern Ireland.

One mechanism which currently exists to try and avoid disputes is that of the Joint Ministerial Committees (JMCs). Intended to provide a forum whereby Ministers of respective governments can meet to discuss matters of interest, meetings of the JMCs have become more regular since the 2016 EU Referendum, but there is a strong sense that they are not working as well as they should. There is frustration on the part of the devolved administrations that Westminster does not wish to concede control of decision making on areas such as the content of Common Frameworks. This is perhaps understandable, in an environment of political difference, where the Scottish Government is run by those committed to dismantling the United Kingdom, but it hardly makes a stable basis for building positive relationships.

The other issue which has become apparent is that the JMCs provide no voice for England. Westminster Ministers are there performing what is in effect a dual role – representing both the UK Government, with its interest in all parts of the Union, and also representing devolved matters for England in the absence of any separate English legislature. So there is an inbuilt imbalance in the structure of JMCs as they presently exist.

Our departure from the EU provides the impetus to introduce important governmental and constitutional reforms to create a ‘quasi-federal’ future for the four nations of the Union.

A federal UK?

Even before we faced the challenge of Brexit, constitutional tensions within the United Kingdom were well-established. As the journalist David Torrance has pointed out,[ii] it is now nearly a century since federalism of the UK was considered as a response to the threat of Irish secession. Federalism was adopted as official Liberal Party, and then Liberal Democrat Party policy, but despite participation in governments by both Liberals and Liberal Democrats over many decades, very little progress has been made in that direction.

Around the time of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum there was a significant degree of chatter around federalism, motivated mainly by the desire amongst unionists that the United Kingdom needed to be kept together at a time of resurgent Scottish nationalism. For example, in August 2014, the former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that the UK would be a federal state “within two years” if independence was defeated [iii] whilst two months earlier I spoke at a Glasgow University and Reform Scotland event along with Michael Moore MP making the federalist case.[iv] Federalism was seen as a way of addressing Scottish and Welsh disenchantment with Westminster, while maintaining the United Kingdom as a single state.

Federalism featured in the House of Commons, when the Romford MP Andrew Rosindell introduced in 2014 a Bill under the ten minute rule in the House of Commons to create a federal United Kingdom, with separate parliaments for the four component nations, and a UK Parliament retaining overall responsibilities, for example for defence, foreign affairs, national security, management of currency, and other clearly defined areas.[v] Support came from representatives of no fewer than seven different political parties: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, UKIP, SNP, Plaid Cymru and DUP. Among the sponsors was the Chairman of the 1922 backbench committee, Sir Graham Brady MP. The Bill had no prospect of becoming law, but was an interesting indication of the thinking amongst Members of Parliament from across the political spectrum. There have also been calls from various Tory grandees, including Sir Malcolm Rifkind, Lord Salisbury and Lord Lexden, for some sort of federal settlement.[vi][vii]

The term ‘federalism’ has, admittedly, tended to mean different things to different people. At its core, it is the belief that sovereignty is entrenched at each layer of government, as opposed to the current UK constitutional position, whereby sovereignty remains at Westminster. We have devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but these derive their authority from Westminster. The standoff between the UK and Scottish governments over the EU Withdrawal Bill, and the subsequent pleadings in the Supreme Court over the legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament’s EU Continuity Bill, demonstrate that Westminster still retains the power to override devolved decisions.

Indeed, this power is stated explicitly in the Scotland Act 1998, Section 28 (7) of which provides: “This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.”[viii]

Commenting on this provision, the Supreme Court recently stated: “Notwithstanding the conferral of legislative authority on the Scottish Parliament, the UK Parliament remains sovereign, and its legislative power in relation to Scotland is undiminished. It reflects the essence of devolution: in contrast to a federal model, a devolved system preserves the powers of the central legislature of the state in relation to all matters, whether devolved or reserved.”[ix]

However, the Scotland Act 2016 enacted two amendments to the Scotland Act 1998, which were intended to entrench the role of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government in the UK Constitution. Section 63a of the Scotland Act 1998 (inserted by Section 1 of the Scotland Act 2016) states explicitly that: “The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements”.[x] It goes on to make it clear that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government can only be abolished consequent to a referendum of the Scottish people. The Scotland Act 2016 gave statutory recognition to the Sewel Convention by inserting into Section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998 (by Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016) a declaration that: “It is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.[xi]

Whilst these statements are of significant symbolic importance, it does remain the case that while the overriding sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament continues, Westminster could unilaterally repeal, or amend, these provisions. That might be possible as a matter of a law, but clearly would be politically incendiary if it were to fly in the face of Scottish public opinion. It might well be politically impossible for Westminster to abolish these institutions, although technically it is possible.

There are models of federalism throughout the world, including Germany, the USA, Australia and Canada. All are regarded as credible and stable, although none are without internal tensions. Significantly, the federal constitutions of both Australia and Canada were created by previous Westminster governments, as was, to a large extent, the current federal constitution of Germany. It is a feature of federal systems that each tier of government has substantial responsibility for raising the money that it spends, although there will always be a degree of cross-subsidy whereby the stronger states or regions support the weaker, in order to provide national cohesion, and shared risk and reward. The balance of power and responsibility between the federal parliament, and decisions taken at a state or regional level, is clear, and documented in a written constitution, and an independent constitutional court acts as an arbiter in areas of dispute.

So would it be possible to reconstitute the United Kingdom as a federal country? There are some features of the UK constitution which already mirror aspects of federalism. We have substantial devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Scotland Act 2016 granted the Scottish Parliament significant additional fiscal powers, relatively greater than those held by comparative legislators in most federal states, including those in Germany, the USA and Australia. Only in Canada do sub-national states have greater fiscal powers.

Whilst the powers of the Welsh Assembly do not match those in Scotland, there is nevertheless a sense that Wales is on a journey to acquire additional fiscal responsibilities. And, whilst the Northern Irish Assembly might currently be suspended, that is another institution with significant legislative and fiscal powers.

The England problem

But the development of asymmetric devolution to the Celtic nations within the UK has created an imbalanced situation. There are no parallel structures created, or even being proposed, for England. While there may well be a campaign for an English Parliament, it is not one that has a great deal of sympathy amongst politicians within Westminster in any of the major political parties.

There was an amendment of the rules of the House of Commons in 2015 to deliver ‘English votes for English laws (EVEL)’ in an attempt to deal with the ‘West Lothian Question.’ This remains largely politically untested in an environment where we have a minority Conservative government which represents a majority of English constituencies. Indeed, there have been occasions where the House of Commons has acted as a de facto English Parliament: between 2015 and 2017, there were fifteen bills which included provisions certified as England-only or England and Wales-only by the Speaker.[xii] But it is too early to say how stable the current EVEL arrangements are.

In principle, there is no reason why a new English Parliament, with powers similar to those held at Holyrood, could not be created. In his aforementioned Westminster Bill, Andrew Rosindell MP proposed that English MPs could have dual roles as UK MPs sitting in the House of Commons, and English MPs sitting in the Chamber of a new English Parliament.

This might make sense in theory, but it is hard to see how it might work in practice. It is difficult to find examples of any working federal systems in the world where one of the sub-national states has 85% of the total population, and the overwhelming share of the wealth.[xiii] The US Federation has states with widely varying populations, from Wyoming with just over 500,000 people, to California with more than 39 million, but with 50 states in total there is not the same concern about over dominance by one unit.[xiv]

Given the relative size and wealth of England, any ‘First Minister of England’ would in practice be as powerful, if not more powerful, a politician than the UK Prime Minister. Within a federal UK Parliament, the interests of England would overwhelm those of the other partners in the federation. It is difficult to see how a lasting, stable, and successful partnership could be created in such circumstances.

The alternative approach is to federate within England itself. Again, while this might work in theory, there is very little interest amongst English people for the sort of regional government that would be required to balance a Scottish Parliament, or a Welsh or Northern Irish Assembly. When the last Labour Government tried to establish a regional assembly in the North-East of England in 2004, the public vote was 78% to 22% against.[xv]

There certainly have been positive developments towards more local autonomy in recent years, including the establishment of the London Assembly and the position of elected Mayors across a range of English cities. And, in January 2019, the Minister for the Northern Powerhouse, Jake Berry MP, said that the UK Government was considering creating a ‘Department for the North of England’, with its own Secretary of State, and also that he was open to the region having its own power to set tax rates.[xvi]

But even these radical reforms are a long way from creating legislative devolution. And, in truth, it is hard to imagine people within England demanding different laws to apply in Yorkshire from those in Lancashire, for example.

The conclusion must be that moving the United Kingdom to a pure federal structure is fraught with difficulties, at least in the short to medium term. Without a significant demand within England for regionalisation, the UK cannot move towards the sort of federal system that we see in Australia or Canada. But there is another option which would take us part of the away there.

‘Quasi-federalism’, instead

The solution proposed by the Society of Conservative Lawyers in 2014 was ‘quasi federalism’. In September 2014, they published Our quasi-federal Kingdom,[xvii] stopping short of recommending federalism, but proposing significant reforms to entrench quasi-federal arrangements. This was followed in May 2015 by a publication from the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, A constitutional crossroads: ways forward for the United Kingdom, which came to similar conclusions.[xviii]

The SCL saw quasi-federalism as having many of the features of a federal system, with substantial devolution of power from the centre, and a recognition of the UK as a union of territories of distinct identities. Unlike a pure federal arrangement, ultimate sovereignty would remain with Westminster. They proposed the introduction of English votes for English laws, and the creation of an English voice on English government.

The Bingham Centre Report, a year later, proposed a new Charter of the Union as an essential part of UK Constitutional Law; a charter which would be the first step to a written constitution. Fiscal devolution should be progressed but on clear principles, with a review of the Barnett Formula, and the machinery governing the UK’s relationship with constituent nations overhauled. Devolution in other nations of the Union should be accompanied by decentralisation in England, including passing down to cities and other local authorities fiscal powers.

This quasi-federalism would not be perfectly balanced, it would not be easily encapsulated in a new written constitution, and it might appear to be something of a messy compromise, but it might just make sense. And it might help keep the United Kingdom together at a time of significant change.

In fact, this quasi-federalism would help resolve two constitutional problems which are seemingly intractable: the ‘West Lothian Question’ and the reform of the House of Lords. The former has been addressed to some degree by EVEL. But the latter remains unresolved. There is a long-overdue opportunity to address this issue.

So what might be the characteristics of a quasi-federal UK, and what practical steps might be necessary to bring this about? There are four key reforms that are required if we are to go down this route.

1. A new Statute or Charter of Union

As much as a statement of intent as anything else, there should be a formal declaration from the UK Parliament that we are now a quasi-federal state. The Society of Conservative Lawyers (SCL), in their 2014 paper, suggested that the UK Parliament should pass an enactment entitled ‘The Statute of Union’, which should begin with the words: “It is hereby declared that the United Kingdom is a quasi-federal, voluntary union of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland”.

At that time, they argued that the Statute should contain new provisions for devolution to Scotland, including the complete devolution of personal income tax – a recommendation which has effectively now been superseded by the Scotland Act 2016 – and they also suggested further reforms to the Welsh Assembly, some of which have already been progressed. The same Statute would introduce the procedural changes to the House of Commons proposed by the Mackay Commission to implement EVEL, including the designation of an English Grand Committee composed of all MPs representing constituencies in England.[xix] This Grand Committee would, according to the SCL, consider whether or not to approve legislation proposed by the UK Government which would have a separate and distinct effect on England in a manner akin to a devolved legislature contemplating passing a Legislative Consent Motion.

The SCL quote with approval the Welsh Conservative AM David Melding who in his book: The reformed Union: the UK as a Federation, published in 2013, argues that “Declaring the United Kingdom a federal state is more important than writing a federal constitution”.[xx] As the SCL stated, “There needs to be a formal statement of the highest authority formalising the change in the character of the UK which will have occurred between 1998 and the completion of the currently envisaged phase of devolution”.[xxi]

The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law suggested in 2015 a variant on this idea of a Statute of Union, proposing what they described as a new ‘Charter of Union’. As with the SCL recommendation, this would state that ‘the United Kingdom is a voluntary union of four component parts’. It would go on to set out key principles for the United Kingdom’s union constitutionalism, among them respect for democracy, respect for the rule of law, a shared commitment to personal liberty and human rights, social solidarity, common security and defence, a common economic framework, autonomy, subsidiarity, accountability, and comity, trust and fair dealing. These values would, according to the authors of the Bingham Centre report, be clearly and authoritatively expressed in law, and imbedded into UK constitutional law by means of a Westminster statute. In order to provide a ‘higher’ status to this law, the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998, and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 “shall be construed to have effect subject to” the Charter, this effectively giving it the same status as the European Communities Act 1972. The Charter of Union would also provide in law for the United Kingdom’s inter-governmental machinery.[xxii]

2. Lords Reform: a new Senate representing different parts of the UK

It is hard to find anyone now who defends the House of Lords as it currently exists. It has grown far too large, with greater numbers than the Commons; its members are either political appointees, relying on the patronage of party leaders in the Commons, or alternatively members of a small rump of hereditary peers, or are there by virtue of being bishops. Even those Tories who for many years defended the Lords as an institution have become much less enthusiastic for it as they have witnessed the largely Remain-voting Lordships seeking to cause difficulty for the minority Conservative government trying to implement the outcome of the EU referendum. Today, the Lords has fewer supporters than at any point in the past, and surely it is ripe for reform.

Therefore, the second necessary reform to create a quasi-federal UK is the replacement of the existing House of Lords. This is a recommendation of the Bingham Centre Report which, whilst accepting that its authors have not had time to consider the question of Lords’ reform in any detail, nonetheless recommended serious consideration of a reformed House of Lords, formally representing in Westminster the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. It is, they say, “a feature of many federal systems which is designed to bind the centre with the component parts, is that of a body – normally the Upper House of Parliament, which consists wholly or partially of representatives of the regions within the state.”[xxiii]

The existing house should be replaced with an upper chamber which is largely, if not entirely, elected, rather than appointed. This Senate would represent different parts of the United Kingdom, providing the requisite political balance and the appropriate counterweight to the House of Commons, with its own electoral mandate.  Hereditary peers and bishops, historical anachronisms if ever there were, should be removed. The new upper house should fulfil the role of a revising chamber, not a challenge to the House of Commons, and of necessity much smaller in size, but providing representation from the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, including (assuming there were demand) the different regions of England.

3. Inter-governmental structures: a new UK Council of Ministers

There is a need to replace the existing Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) system with a different structure, such as a UK Council of Ministers.

The intergovernmental relationships within the United Kingdom need to be put on a more formalised footing. According to the Bingham Centre Report, “inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom are characterised by informality and, to the extent to which they are regulated at all, are regulated by conventions, concordat, memorandums of understanding, and guidance notes.” The most significant basis is the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’[xxiv], which has no statutory base. It is, according to that Bingham Centre Report’s authors, “based on the right sentiments but the machinery it establishes is too weak to ensure that the sentiments find their way into practice.”

In order to address these failings, the SCL proposed an annual UK summit, chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by five teams representing, respectively, the UK Government, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the English Grand Committee, with the venue rotating between London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. This would have both a ceremonial and political role, facilitating discussions between both politicians and officials. While this idea has merit, it is in itself insufficient to provide the necessary forum for the level of intergovernmental engagement that will be required post-Brexit.

The Bingham Centre Report suggested that the ‘Charter of Union’ that they recommended, as detailed earlier, should incorporate provisions on intergovernmental machinery, which could reshape the UK’s arrangements in light of the constitutional principles listed in it, and also amend the Joint Ministerial Committees (JMC) machinery so that the UK Government is less dominant within it, in their words: “making the arrangements more of a partnership, and less of a hierarchy.”[xxv]

As discussed earlier, the establishment of UK Common Frameworks will require much closer intergovernmental cooperation than we have currently seen. EU decisions around the equivalent Common Frameworks are handled by the Council of Ministers, with representation of the current EU28 members and rules around voting which allow national vetoes for matters of significant strategic interest, and Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in other areas.

Here is a model that a quasi-federal United Kingdom might wish to follow. The existing JMC meetings could be replaced by regular meetings of a UK Council of Ministers, representing the component parts of the country, meeting to discuss matters of mutual interest, and seek resolution of disputes. It is a model that would require a substantive engagement from government at all levels, and significant input from the UK Government in particular, if it were to function properly.

4. Representing England: An English Grand Committee

England needs to have its own voice within these new structures, one distinct from that of the UK Government.

One matter remains unresolved. A Council of Ministers that comprises just representation from the UK Government and the Governments of Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland would effectively leave England unrepresented. The UK Government representative would attend such meetings effectively in a dual role, representing both the interests of England, and also the wider strategic interests of the UK as a whole. Whilst these might often overlap, they would not always coincide. And this leaves the people of England without a voice.

When considering the imbalance in devolution, the SCL rejected the notion both of a separate English Parliament, and also that of a distinct English Executive. However, as aforementioned, they did call for the establishment of an English Grand Committee, which could be the vehicle for providing the voice that England requires.

So might an English Grand Committee elect a representative to a Council of Ministers, to be the voice of England? That individuals or individuals would at least have a democratic mandate, albeit that they might not hold government office. Nevertheless, there would be nothing to stop the English Grand Committee appointing a serving UK Government Minister to that role.

This would ensure a better balance within a UK Council of Ministers than exists within the current JMC system, where the interests of England are not distinctly represented. And it would allow the possibility at least of decisions being taken along lines similar to that in the EU Council of Ministers, where there are vetoes held by representatives in certain areas, but in others a system of QMV applies.

The UK Government’s objection to QMV at present is easy to understand: representing both the wider UK strategic interests, and also the dominant population of England, to be outvoted by the representatives of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, would seem like the tail wagging the dog. Nor would any UK Government want representatives of devolved governments who are separatists, and thus committed to the disintegration of the United Kingdom, to have a right of veto over policies that would affect the entirety of the UK.

But a QMV system, with weighting to reflect the relative population of the component UK parts, and a representation for England, would allow the UK Government interests only to be outvoted if all four component parts were to combine together. And that might give UK Ministers some reassurance that they were not to be outvoted on a regular basis on matters of significant importance to the national interest.

Conclusion

This package of reforms could, together, address a number of current issues.

First, it modernises the UK Constitution, and allows it to adapt to the new situation that has been created following our departure from the EU, and the disapplication of EU law.

Second, it delivers the long-awaited and overdue reform of the House of Lords, giving a better balance to the UK Constitution and protecting the interests of the nations and regions furthest from London.

Third, it allows the people of England for the first time a proper voice within the institutions of the UK, distinct from that of the UK Government, which also has to have a wider consideration for all the Union’s component parts.

Fourth, it addresses the continuing concerns that exist in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and also are growing in many parts of England, about an over-centralised state where, despite asymmetric devolution over a period of two decades, there is still pressure for more power to be passed down from the centre.

It was the pressures on the United Kingdom that led David Melding AM, then the Deputy Presiding Officer of the Welsh National Assembly, to call for a federal UK in 2013, writing at the time: “Only a reformed unionist ideology can hope to respond to the momentous constitutional events of our times.”[xxvi] With support for Scottish independence still hovering around the 45% mark,[xxvii] it is clear that unionists have an obligation to try and bring some lasting stability to the UK Constitution, and that defending the current unbalanced and unwieldy arrangements are not in the long term interests of those who wish to see the UK stay together.

The Italian novelist Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa famously wrote, “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” It might prove to be an unexpected benefit from Brexit that it gives us the impetus to do so.

Murdo Fraser has been a Member of the Scottish Parliament for the Mid Scotland and Fife region since 2001, having previously practised as a solicitor mainly in the field of commercial law. He served as Deputy Leader of the Scottish Conservatives from 2006 to 2011, and is currently Party spokesman on Finance, and sits on the Scottish Parliament’s Finance and Constitution Committee. He writes in a personal capacity, and the opinions in this paper do not represent Scottish Conservative policy.

The views expressed in this essay are those of the author, not necessarily those of Bright Blue.

[i] The areas affected are mainly in the fields of environmental protection, agriculture, food standards and public procurement. The full list is published here: Gov.uk, “Frameworks analysis: breakdown of EU law that intersect with devolved competence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/686991/20180307-FINAL__Frameworks_analysis_for_publication_on_9_March_2018.pdf (2018),  17-19.

[ii] David Torrance, Britain Re-booted: Scotland in a federal union (Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2014).

[iii] Andrew Whitaker, “Gordon Brown backs federalism in event of No vote”, The Scotsman, 15 August, 2014.

[iv] BBC News, “Scottish independence: Conservative MSP calls for a federal UK”, 26 June, 2014.

[v] Hansard, “Parliamentary and constitutional reform”, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141125/debtext/141125-0002.htm#14112553000003 (2014), column 795.

[vi] Alastair Lexden, “Only federalism can now save the United Kingdom, says Alistair Lexden”, https://www.alistairlexden.org.uk/news/only-federalism-can-now-save-united-kingdom-says-alistair-lexden (2015).

[vii] Martin Kettle, “Brexit vote paves way for federal union to save UK, says all-party group”, The Guardian, 10 July, 2016.

[viii] legislation.gov.uk, “Scotland Act 1998”, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/section/28 (1998).

[ix] The Supreme Court, “Judgement: The UK withdrawal from the European Union (legal continuity) (Scotland) Bill – a reference by the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland”, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2018-0080-judgment.pdf (2018), Paragraph 41.

[x] legislation.gov.uk, “Scotland Act 2016”, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/11/section/1/enacted (2016), Section 1.

[xi] Ibid., section 2.

[xii] Rt Hon. David Lidington MP, “Technical review of the standing orders related to English votes for English laws and the procedures they introduced”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/603540/2017-03-27_English_Votes_for_English_Laws_Technical_Review_Document.pdf (2017), 1.

[xiii] Office for National Statistics, “Dataset: regional gross value added (income approach)”, https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossvalueaddedgva/datasets/regionalgrossvalueaddedincomeapproach (2018).

[xiv] World Atlas, “The 50 US states ranked by population”, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/us-states-by-population.html (2018).

[xv] BBC News, “North East votes ‘no’ to assembly”, 5 November, 2004.

[xvi] Ben Barnett, “North could set own taxes as part of new government department for region – Jake Berry”, The Yorkshire Post, 13 January, 2019.

[xvii] Society of Conservative Lawyers, “Our quasi-federal kingdom: a report of a working party of the Society of Conservative Lawyers”, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/e1a359_d307d54133024a2c9a8bea77983c0797.pdf (2014).

[xviii] The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “A constitutional crossroads: ways forward for the United Kingdom”, https://www.biicl.org/documents/595_a_constitutional_crossroads.pdf?showdocument=1 (2015).

[xix] The McKay Commission, “Report of the commission on the consequences of devolution for the House of Commons”, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130403030728/http://tmc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/The-McKay-Commission_Main-Report_25-March-20131.pdf (2013), 54.

[xx] David Melding, “The reformed union: the UK as a federation”, https://www.iwa.wales/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/reformedunion-smallpdf-com.pdf (2013).

[xxi] Society of Conservative Lawyers, “Our quasi-federal kingdom”, 51.

[xxii] British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “A constitutional crossroads”, 19-22.

[xxiii] Ibid., 17.

[xxiv] The Memorandum of Understanding establishes the Joint Ministerial Committee system, designed to ensure that the devolved administrations are “involved in the discussions within the UK Government about the formulation of the UK’s policy position on all issues which touch on matters which fall within the responsibility of the devolved administrations” [MoU (2013), Para 34.3]

[xxv] British Institute of International and Comparative Law, “A constitutional crossroads”, 9-11.

[xxvi] Melding, “The reformed union”.

[xxvii] What Scotland Thinks, “How would you vote in a Scottish independence referendum if held now? (asked after the EU referendum)”, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-a-scottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-ask#line (2018).